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CLOSING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE
DOOR ON PROPERTY OWNERS: THE
RIPENESS AND ABSTENTION DOCTRINES
IN SECTION 1983 LAND USE CASES
Brian W. Blaesser*
If increased state autonomy and reduced federal case loads
can be purchased only with the coin of more constitutional violations and fewer constitutional remedies, the price is high ....
If we want to nominate a particular group of cases for exclusion from the federal courthouse, we should look at groups in which
federal law is not sensitively at issue rather than at one in which
fundamental constitutional rights are at stake.
-Justice Harry A. Blackmun'
INTRODUCTION

The objective of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 18712 was
to open the federal courts to persons who sought to vindicate violations of their civil rights. Congressional debates on the Act focused
on the need for a federal right of action to protect private rights in
the face of the failure of state courts to enforce the law with an
equal hand.' Section 1983, the cornerstone of the Act, was premised
on the view that a state denied constitutional protection of private
rights whenever its judicial or executive authorities consistently,
* Partner, Siemon, Larsen & Purdy, Chicago, Illinois, Boca Raton, Florida and Newport
Beach, California. B.A. 1969, Brown University; J.D. 1979, Boston College Law School;
M.C.P. 1979, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of William D. McElyea, Sue Helen Hyman, and Melora Furman in conducting
preliminary research for this article.
I. Speech of Justice Harry A. Blackmun at the New York University School of Law
(Nov., 1984), quoted in Kaplan, Justice Blackmun, In Talk, Makes A Plea For Sec. 1983, 7
NAT'L L. J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 23, col.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
3. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 342, 368, 374, 428, 444, 457-59, 460,
476, 505-06, 653, App. 78, 167, 185, 248-49, 252.
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"permanently[,] and as a rule" 4 refused to enforce its laws for the
protection of a class of persons. Congress vested jurisdiction in the
federal courts to enforce this Civil Rights statute.'
Beginning with Monroe v. Pape,6 the Supreme Court rendered a
series of decisions that significantly expanded the scope of section
1983. In its analysis of the legislative history of the statute, the

Court stressed the fact that: "the purposes [of § 1983] were much
broader. The . . . aim was to provide a federal remedy where the

state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice."'
The reasons why section 1983 suits should have a federal forum
are at least threefold. First, where there are allegations that a wrong

was committed under color of state law, there is "an inherent potential for bias" in the state court.' Second, judicial review of allegations involving activities that are unpopular locally is best conducted
by life-tenure federal judges whose jobs are not subject to parochial
pressures.9 Finally, because the essence of a section 1983 action is

the assertion of a national right, 10 federal judges may have a greater
understanding of and sympathy with constitutional goals. Review of
their decisions through the federal appellate system will help ensure

the uniform application of civil rights principles.11
Subsequently, in Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,11 and

Owen v. City of Independence,"3 the Court held that the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 was also intended to provide a federal remedy for municipal conduct that violates fundamental constitutional rights. The
Court has consistently declined to order abstention in cases involving
civil rights claims. 4 That the rights of property are fundamental
4. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 334.
5. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1982).
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. Id. at 174.
8. See Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1358
(1970).
9. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 427 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Romero v. Weakley, 226 F. 2d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 1955); cf. THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 80 & 82 (A. Hamilton).
10. See Chevigny, supra note 8, at 1356-58.
I I. See Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After State Court Judgment, 191 COLO.
LAw REV. 191, 192 (1972).
12. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
13. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
14. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1965); Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-79 (1964). But see Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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civil rights deserving of protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is now
well established under the decisions of the Supreme Court.15 Land
use cases brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, therefore, should not constitute an exception to the federal courts' congressionally-mandated duty to adjudicate cases properly before
them.
However, in the period since Monell and Owen, the lower federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hamilton Bank 6
and MacDonald 7 cases, have increasingly applied doctrinal and
statutory bars to causes of action in land use cases brought under
section 1983. In particular, the federal courts have applied the doctrines of ripeness and abstention to either dismiss or stay constitutional challenges to land use decisions, in effect, leaving the federal
courthouse door only slightly ajar for land use cases which involve
only the most egregious examples of arbitrary action by local
governments.
A hypothetical case illustrates the problems that these two doctrines pose in land use cases brought under section 1983. Assume a
zoning ordinance restricts a landowner's land to single-family residential use. The landowner submits a development plan application
to a city, accompanied by a request to rezone his property from single family residential to multifamily. The planning commission's recommendation is forwarded to the city council for final action.
Before any action is taken by the city, the landowner receives
permission from the commission to withdraw to discuss alternative
development plans which might be acceptable to the city. After a
period of six months, during which the landowner engaged in numerous discussions with the planning staff and submitted a new conceptual proposal, which was discouraged by staff, the landowner decides
to resubmit his original proposal. The proposal is rejected by the
planning commission again and the city council upholds the commission's recommendation. The landowner sues in federal court under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a taking of his property and substantive
due process and equal protection violations.
The federal court will dismiss the landowner's case on the
ground that he failed to first seek just compensation through available state procedures, as required by the ripeness doctrine. Even if the
15. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
16. Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
17. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
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landowner had first utilized the state's inverse condemnation procedures, the court might still dismiss the case on ripeness grounds because the record indicates that the landowner submitted only one
formal development proposal. Evidence that the city rejected only
one formal proposal may not be sufficient to convince the court that
the landowner obtained a final determination of the nature and intensity of development that the city would permit on the property.
Without such a determination, the court would reason that it would
be unable to evaluate the economic impact of the challenged decision
and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investmentbacked expectations. Unless the landowner can demonstrate to the
court that the six months of negotiations are evidence that reapplication to the city could be futile - the exception to the ripeness doctrine
- his case will be dismissed for lack of ripeness. This dismissal will
also encompass the landowner's substantive due process and equal
protection claims because the court is likely to regard these two additional claims as integrally related to his taking claim.
Even if the landowner overcomes the jurisdictional obstacle
posed by the ripeness doctrine, the federal court may decide that the
local nature of the landowner's dispute involves unsettled questions
of state law which require the court to abstain from any further proceeding until those state law questions have been resolved in state
court.
This article analyzes constitutional challenges to land use cases
brought in federal court under section 1983 a*s well as under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Its purpose is to document the jurisdictional and practical obstacles that have been erected by the federal
courts over the past 15 years in response to constitutional challenges
to land use controls and to show how these obstacles are both
overburdensome and inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983
and constitutional principles. It is the author's contention that the
pendulum has swung too far, particularly in the imposition of these
doctrinal barriers to land use cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
- a statute whose fundamental purpose is to provide a federal remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights, especially where the
state courts have been less than even-handed in their review of property owner's claims.
In Part I below, the doctrines of ripeness and abstention are
defined and analyzed as they have been applied in the context of
land use cases. The discussion in Part II examines the federal court
ripeness and abstention decisions in more detail, on a circuit-by-cir-
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cuit basis, identifying the differences in the application of the doctrines among the circuits and suggesting trends where apparent. Finally, Part III analyzes the issues which remain unresolved in the
application of the ripeness and abstention doctrines to the field of
land use and addresses the substantive and procedural pitfalls which
property owners face in seeking redress in federal court for violations
of their constitutional rights.

I.

THE DOCTRINES

A.

Ripeness

Ripeness is a specific category of justiciability. 18 Concepts of
justiciability have been developed by the courts to clarify the limits
that the Constitution places on the federal judiciary and to identify
appropriate occasions for judicial action.1 9 In the case of ripeness,
the federal courts determine whether a dispute has matured sufficiently such that it warrants a decision on the merits in order to
satisfy the "case or controversy" mandate of article III of the
Constitution.2
In the land use context, the ripeness doctrine has developed in
response to regulatory taking claims. It is applied to both components of such a claim, namely, (1) that the regulation has gone so
far that it constitutes a taking of a landowner's property and (2) that
whatever compensation is available through state procedures is "unjust." With regard to the first part of the regulatory takings claim,
the ripeness doctrine requires the court to inquire whether the local
government's decision regarding application of its regulation to the
property was sufficiently "final" to enable the court to properly assess whether the regulation went "too far." This is referred to as the
"finality" requirement. 1 In order to establish the second component
of a takings claim, the plaintiff landowner must demonstrate that he
or she sought and was denied "just" compensation through the
state's inverse condemnation procedures, or that such procedures on
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIS§ 3529 (1984).
19. Id.
20. Id., § 3532. The "cases and controversies" language of article IIl of the United
States Constitution limits the types of cases that may be heard by federal courts having article
Ill powers, i.e., life tenure and compensation that shall not be diminished.
21. Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).
18.

C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER

DICTION 2D
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their face are inadequate (or simply not available). 2 The answer to
these questions will determine whether a court has jurisdiction even
to hear the landowner's as applied takings claim, and may result in
all related claims, substantive due process, procedural3 due process
and equal protection claims, being dismissed as well.1
1. The Finality Requirement.-The finality requirement of the
ripeness doctrine is best understood in terms of thresholds: an application threshold, an administrative relief threshold, and a reapplication threshold. Each must be satisfied in order to avoid dismissal of
an as applied taking claim on the ground of prematurity. 4
The application threshold requires that a property owner have
applied for and been denied approval of a particular building plan
before his or her claim is mature for federal court determination.
The U.S. Supreme Court first applied the ripeness doctrine in a land
use context in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City. 5
The city's landmarks commission had refused to allow a high-rise
building over Grand Central Terminal, a designated historic
landmark, and Penn Central challenged this as an unconstitutional
taking of its property. The Court rejected Penn Central's taking
claim, in part because Penn Central had "not sought approval for
the construction of a smaller structure" than the 50-story office
building it had proposed. 2 The Court said that it could not decide
the taking claim on the merits because it did not know whether the
plaintiff would be denied any use of the airspace above the Terminal
7
building.
Two years later, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,2s the Court emphasized that a landowner must submit a land use proposal and obtain a decision from the local government before an as applied challenge to the zoning ordinance will be considered ripe for
22. Inverse condemnation procedures may be either administrative or judicial. To date,
most of the federal courts have looked to existing state court procedures in determining
whether an inverse condemnation procedure is available.
23. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
24. Id. at 186.
25. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
26. Id. at 137. The Court also supported its holding by arguing that the Grand Central
Terminal property retained considerable value even after the limits imposed by the landmarks
commission because the development rights in the airspace above the terminal building were
transferable to other parcels in the vicinity, which were also owned by Penn Central. Id. at
138.
27. Id.
28. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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adjudication. In Agins, the plaintiffs' land was classified under a
zone that permitted single-family dwellings at a density of between
one and five single family residences on their 5-acre tract. In order
to enable the city to determine how many dwellings it would allow
within this density range, the two adopted ordinances required developers to submit a development plan. The plaintiffs, without submitting a development plan, attacked the ordinances on their face,
claiming that the enactment of the ordinances effected a taking of
their property. The Court dismissed the case, reasoning that the
plaintiffs were "free to pursue their reasonable investment-backed
expectations by submitting a development plan to local officials." 9
The Court did not discuss its holding in terms of the ripeness doctrine. However, the minimum threshold requirement that emerged
from the decision was clear: a claim that an ordinance as applied to
a landowner's property constitutes a taking will not be considered
ripe for judicial decision unless the plaintiff has submitted a development plan for approval when the ordinance authorizes such an application. Under the reasoning of Agins, a failure to seek not only zoning but other required approvals, such as site plan approval, would
also cause dismissal of a taking case in federal court."0
In Williamson County Regional PlanningCommission v. Hamilton Bank, the Supreme Court articulated a second threshold requirement for ripeness - the requirement that administrative relief
be sought before coming to court."1 In that case, the planning commission gave a developer preliminary approval for the subdivision of
a large single-family development and then gave final approval for
some of the single-family dwellings the developer planned to build.
The Commission required the developer to submit a revised preliminary subdivision plat before it approved the remaining sections of the
development. By this time, the county had amended the zoning ordinance to reduce the number of dwelling units allowed in the development. The Commission rejected the revised plat because of a number
of problems with the development. These included dwelling units in
excess of the number permitted by the revised zoning ordinance,
dwelling units placed on slopes where building was prohibited, and
problems with roads and road grading. 2
29.
30.
whether
31.
32.

Id. at 262.
The Court did address the one question which was properly before it, namely,
"the mere enactment of the zoning ordinances constitutes a taking." Id. at 260.
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
Id. at 179-180.
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The plaintiff sued in federal court under section 1983 of the
federal Civil Rights Act.3 3 The jury awarded compensation for a
temporary taking, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme
Court held the case was not ripe for decision because it could not
decide a taking claim until the administrative agency had "arrived at
a final, definitive position" that applied the regulation to the plaintiff's land.34 Even though the plaintiff had submitted a plan for development, as Agins required, it had not sought variances authorized
by the subdivision and zoning ordinances that would have overcome
the Commission's objections. The Court acknowledged that in Patsy
v. Board of Regents36 it had previously held the exhaustion of remedies is not required in section 1983 actions. However, it distinguished
exhaustion of remedies from the finality requirement that underlies
the ripeness doctrine, explaining:
[T]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial
decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that
inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an
injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a
remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise
inappropriate. 6
The Court illustrated this distinction by comparing the variance procedures in the county ordinances with procedures that the plaintiff
would not have to exhaust under the Patsy rule. The Court gave two
examples: (1) the plaintiff would not have to bring a declaratory
judgment action to review county zoning and planning actions; this
procedure was "clearly remedial"; furthermore, (2) the plaintiff
would not have to appeal the Commission's rejection of its subdivision to the Board of Zoning Appeals because the Board was authorized only to review a rejection, not to participate in the Commission's decision making.3" According to the Court in Hamilton Bank,
for the plaintiff to have satisfied the second threshold it must have
given the Commission an opportunity to render a final decision. This
required the plaintiff to have sought variances that would have possibly overcome the Commission's objections; one application and de33.
34.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
473 U.S. at 191.

35. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
36. 473 U.S. at 193.
37. The Court's language also suggests that the ripeness rule does not require a plaintiff
to seek judicial review of an adverse decision.

19881

CLOSING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR

nial before the Commission was not enough to establish a taking.
The third threshold requires that the plaintiff has sought reapplication of his or her proposed development. Until the Supreme
Court's decision in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
Yolo,3 8 if a landowner satisfied the first threshold by applying for
development approval and was turned down, a court would likely
find a subsequent takings claim ripe for consideration under the reasoning of Hamilton Bank if the landowner could demonstrate that
he or she had also satisfied the second threshold: use of administrative procedures to seek an exception or "use" variance to authorize
the development as originally proposed. However, in MacDonald,the
Court created a third threshold, which the plaintiff had to meet
before a takings claim would be deemed ripe for adjudication.
In MacDonald, the Court considered an appeal from a California Court of Appeal, which had dismissed a complaint seeking monetary damages for an alleged taking of property resulting from the
planning commission's denial of a subdivision proposal for 159 single-family and multifamily residential lots. The appellants argued
that by denying all permit applications, subdivision maps and other
requests to implement any other use, the county and the city had in
effect restricted the property to an open space agricultural use. The
Court dismissed for lack of ripeness and embraced the California
court's reasoning:
Here plaintiff applied for approval of a particular and relatively
intensive residential development and the application was denied.
The denial of that particular plan cannot be equated with a refusal
to permit any development, and plaintiff concedes that the property
is zoned for residential purposes in the County general plan and
zoning ordinance. Land use planning is not an all-or-nothing proposition. A governmental entity is not required to permit a landowner to develop property to [the] full extent he might desire or be
charged with an unconstitutional taking of the property. Here, as
in Agins, the refusal of the defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable development. Accordingly, the complaint
fails to state a cause of action."
The Court here expressed confidence that the land use and development control process could easily yield an alternative acceptable to
38.
39.

477 U.S. 340 (1986).
Id. at 347 (emphasis added). See also Id. at 352 n.8.
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both the property owner and planning agency. Such optimism, however, presumes more certainty and less discretion in the regulatory
process than in fact exists. As discussed below, this third threshold,
imprecisely defined by the MacDonald Court, has erected a potentially insurmountable barrier to federal jurisdiction in land use disputes involving takings claims.40
The Supreme Court did place some limitations on the reapplication requirement - allowing for an exception where reapplication
would be futile. It noted in MacDonald that "[a] property owner is
• . . not required to resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair
procedures in order to obtain" a final determination on what development would be allowed."' The Court also indicated that the reapplication requirement did not mean that repeated "futile" applications are required. In the Court's view, the California courts had
implied "not that future applications would be futile, but that a
meaningful application had not yet been made."42 The Court did not
explain when an application will be deemed "meaningful," but did
note that "[r] ejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans
does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews.""
2. Requirement to Seek Just Compensation in State
Court.-According to the Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton
Bank, for a plaintiff to satisfy the ripeness doctrine when bringing a
federal taking claim he or she first must have sought just compensation in state court. When the state provides a procedure for securing
compensation, a taking claim is not ripe for decision in federal court
until a plaintiff has used the state procedure "and been denied just
compensation." 4 The Court based this requirement on cases holding
that the federal constitution does not require "pretaking compensation" but is satisfied by reasonable and adequate provision for compensation after a taking has occurred. 5
3. Avoiding the Ripeness Doctrine.-There is one type of takings challenge that avoids the ripeness doctrine altogether: a claim
40. See infra Section III A.
41. 477 U.S. at 350 n. 7.
42. Id. at 353 n.8.
43. Id. at 353 n.9.
44. 473 U.S. at 195.
45. Id. at 196. In the case before it, the Court reviewed eminent domain legislation in
Tennessee, where the case arose, and concluded that it authorized an action for compensation
in land use cases.
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that a regulation on its face and in its entirety (i.e., as it applies to
all affected property, including the landowner's) effects a taking."'
The proper remedy for such a challenge is invalidation of the regulation.'7 However, as the Court noted in Keystone, plaintiffs "face an
uphill battle in making a facial attack on [a regulation] as a taking.' 8 Thus, while such a taking claim may enable a plaintiff to
satisfy the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction, the effectiveness of such a claim on the merits may ultimately prove illusory.
B. Abstention
The Supreme Court has recognized three principal types of abstention, each articulated in a separate decision of the Court: (1)
Pullman abstention, 49 (2) Burford abstention, 50 and (3) Younger
abstention. 1
1. Pullman Abstention.-The Supreme Court first fashioned
the abstention doctrine in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. The
case concerned the intervenor complaint of Pullman porters (all of
whom were black) against the Texas Railroad Commission, challenging its order requiring Pullman conductors (who were white) to
be in charge whenever sleeping cars were operated. The Commission
justified its order on the basis of a Texas statute. The Pullman Company argued that the Commission's order not only was unauthorized
by that statute, but was violative of the equal protection, due process
and commerce clauses of the federal constitution. Commenting on
this challenge to state law authority, Justice Frankfurter wrote for
the Court:
The complaint of the Pullman porters undoubtedly tenders a sub-

stantial constitutional issue. It is more than substantial. It touches
a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought
not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open. Such
constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definitive
ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy.5"

In subsequent decisions interpreting Pullman, the Supreme
46. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). But see
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
47. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1979).
48. 480 U.S. at 494.
49. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
50. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
51. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
52. 312 U.S. at 498.
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Court has consistently held that two standards must be met before
Pullman abstention can be ordered: (1) the state law in question
must be unclear; (2) the state law must be subject to an interpretation that will avoid or substantially alter the federal constitutional
question. These twin standards were best articulated in Harman v.
Forssenius."' There, the Court stated:
Where resolution of the federal constitutional question is dependent
upon, or may be materially altered by, the determination of an uncertain issue of state law, abstention may be proper in order to
avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations, interference
with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of
state law, and premature constitutional adjudication .... The doctrine . . . contemplates that deference to state court adjudication
only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain."
If the federal court abstains under the Pullman doctrine, the proceeding in the federal court is stayed pending resolution by the
plaintiff of the state issues in state court. Provided the plaintiff
reserves the right to return to the federal court in advance, and does
not "unreservedly" litigate his or her federal claims in state court,
the plaintiff may return to the federal court to pursue those remaining federal constitutional claims under section 1983.11
The Supreme Court indicated in Harman v. Forssenius that the
critical consideration in determining the applicability of Pullman abstention is whether in fact the state law in question is "uncertain."
Even if the state law in question has never been interpreted by a
state court, abstention is not warranted if the provision is not fairly
subject to a construction that will substantially modify or avoid the
federal constitutional questions.5 6
In order to satisfy the second standard of the Pullman doctrine,
the burden is on a defendant to identify how, in fact, the constitutional issue can be avoided or limited by a state court decision on the
state law question. The Supreme court emphasized this point more
recently in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff5 7 stating:
In the abstract, of course, such possibilities always exist. But the
53.
54.
55.
56.
357 U.S.
U.S. 385
57.

380 U.S. 528 (1965).
Id. at 534.
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Chicago v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry.,
77 (1958); Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956). See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334
(1948).
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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relevant inquiry is not whether there is a bare, though unlikely,
possibility that state courts might render adjudication of the federal question unnecessary. Rather, "[w]e have frequently emphasized that abstention is not to be ordered unless the statute is of an

uncertain nature, and is obviously susceptible of a limiting construction". Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 and n.14
(1967)."

The judicial policy considerations underlying Pullman abstention are related to the fact that, as Justice Frankfurter stated, Texas
law was "far from clear." ' 9 In addition, the Texas decision construing the relevant statutory language did not resolve the matter at issue. Given the judicial policy of avoiding constitutional questions
where it is possible to do so, a federal court that seeks to decide state
law issues while they are still in an uncertain posture would run a
significant risk of deciding such questions erroneously. If the challenged action were held to be incorrectly authorized under state law,
then the court would reach the federal constitutional issues unnecessarily. A final decision upholding the action on constitutional
grounds would also be erroneous. Conversely, if the federal court
should incorrectly hold that the challenged action is not authorized
under state law, it will have postponed adjudication of the federal
constitutional questions but with the consequence of having enjoined
a valid state program. Should the state courts ultimately decide the
state law issue differently than the federal court, the federal decision
would be subject to reopening.60
The section 1983 land use cases in which the courts have considered Pullman abstention reflect the fundamental tension between
the imperative of carrying out the legislative purposes of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 and the federal courts' intuitive preference to
leave land use cases to the state courts. When confronted by alleged
civil rights violations in the context of land use cases, the federal
courts, without hesitation, have acknowledged that section 1983
cases are the "least likely candidates for abstention." ' However, as
discussed below, the courts' holdings have broadened this judge58. Id. at 237.
59. 312 U.S. at 499.
60. See e.g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S.
177 (1933). See also Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
61. Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967)).
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made exception to the general rule that a federal court should decide
62
a case properly before it.

In those section 1983 land use cases in which the federal courts
have invoked Pullman abstention, only a minority have involved
clearly identified unsettled state law questions.63 In the majority of
the decisions that apply Pullman abstention, the courts have not addressed the extent to which the state law question is unsettled, but
rather have emphasized the second standard of Pullman, namely,
that state court adjudication of the state law issues would avoid or

substantially alter the federal constitutional questions.6
The section 1983 cases in which the federal courts have declined
to abstain on Pullman grounds fall into three general categories: (1)
cases in which the state law in question is clear and would not obviate the need to address the constitutional questions;

5

(2) cases in

which there is no state law question at issue;"" (3) cases which involve specific "conduct," including conspiracy, or discriminatory intent which has allegedly violated a plaintiff's civil rights. 67 The cases
which fall into these categories are discussed in the review of the
federal circuits in Part III below.
62. See infra Figures 3 and 4, notes 102-259, 275-344, and accompanying text..
63. See e.g., Coombs v. Town of Ogunquit, 578 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Me. 1984) (authority
for state and/or municipal agencies to grant request for sewage treatment facility building
permit and the standards to be applied); P.C. Util. Corp. v. Division of Health of Dept. of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 339 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Fla. 1972), a.ff'd without opinion, 472
F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1973) (constitutionality of town's moratoria ordinances under state statutory provision); Overhill Corp. v. City of Grand Junction, 186 F. Supp. 69 (D.Colo. 1960)
(authority of city to adopt and enforce a zoning ordinance under state law or general law).
64. See e.g., C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1983); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975); Muskegon Theatres v. City of Muskegon, 507
F2d. 199 (6th Cir. 1974); Fralin and Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, Virginia, 493 F.2d
481 (4th Cir. 1974); Corder v. City of Sherwood, 579 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Kent
Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978); Dome Condominium Ass'n v.
Goldenberg, 442 F. Supp. 438 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Stallworth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F.
Supp. 236 (S.D. Ala. 1976); Salvati v. Dale, 364 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
65. See, e.g., Amico v. New Castle County, 553 F. Supp. 738 (D. Del. 1982); Town of
Springfield v. State of Vermont Envtl. Bd., 521 F. Supp. 243 (D.Vt. 1981); Chan v. Town of
Brookline, 484 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Mass. 1980); Hotel Coamo Springs v. Hernandez Colon, 426
F. Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976).
66. See, e.g., Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (Ist Cir. 1983);
Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp. 947 (D.N.H. 1971), affid, 469 F.2d
956 (Ist Cirt. 1972).
67. See, e.g., Fralin and Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D.
Va. 1979); Blodgett v. County of Santa Cruz, 502 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd 698
F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1982); Lodestar Co. v. County of Mono, 639 F. Supp. 1439 (E.D. Cal.
1986).
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2. Burford Abstention.-In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,68 the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of an order by the Texas
Railroad Commission for the drilling of certain wells. The Supreme
Court held that deference to the state court was warranted because
the state had established its own elaborate review system for dealing
with the geological complexities of oil and gas fields, and the exercise
of federal court jurisdiction would have an impermissibly disruptive
effect on state policy for the management of those fields." Under
Burford abstention, the federal court does not retain jurisdiction
pending resolution of the state court issues, but rather dismisses the
case entirely. 0
Unlike Pullman abstention, the judicial policy underlying Burford abstention is not premised upon a concern for the consequences
of erroneously deciding an unclear state law issue en route to the
federal questions. Rather, it is concerned with the "disruptive effect"
that federal court intervention could have upon a coherent state system of regulation, the integrity of which transcends the merits of the
particular case in question. Writing for the majority in Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States,7 Justice Brennan explained this judicial policy consideration as follows:
Abstention is also appropriate where there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the
case then at bar. . . .In some cases, however, the state question
itself need not be determinative of state policy. It is enough that
exercise of federal review of the question ... would be disruptive of
state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter
7
of substantial public concern. 1
Examples of section 1983 land use cases in which the federal
courts have relied solely upon Burford as a basis for abstention are
few. More often, as discussed below, the courts intertwine Burfordtype considerations with Pullman abstention in reaching a decision
to abstain, or they may explicitly base their decision on both doc68. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
69. Id. at 317-18. See also Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976); Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341
(1951).
70. See Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978); Stallworth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
71. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
72. Id. at 814.
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trines.7 3 The reason for the limited number of land use cases Iin
which Burford abstention alone has been applied is that zoning and
other land use controls are generally not subject to a single source of
state judicial or administrative control. 74 However, as discussed below, because of the complexity of land use controls in some jurisdictions, some courts are beginning to find land use cases appropriate
for dismissal on the grounds of both Pullman and Burford
abstention.
One substantive area of land use in which Burford abstention
has been held appropriate is the area involving challenges to eminent
domain actions. This substantive area is usually the subject of a state
statutory scheme. Because eminent domain is "intimately involved
with state perogative," the Supreme Court has cautioned against interference by the federal courts.75
3. Younger Abstention.-This abstention doctrine, recognized
in the 1971 Younger decision, 76 states that a federal court should not
intervene by injunctive or declaratory relief in a pending state law
enforcement proceeding. Younger itself involved a pending state
criminal prosecution. Since the 1971 decision, the court has broadened the scope of Younger abstention to include certain types of civil
cases. The principal difference between Younger abstention and
Pullman and Burford abstentions is that the focus of Younger is
upon the existence of a parallel state proceeding. The controlling
principle for Younger abstention is whether the federal case involves
an effort to enjoin a state judicial proceeding." Under Younger abstention, unlike Pullman abstention, the case is dismissed rather
73. See infra, notes 338-346 and accompanying text.
74. Heritage Farms v. Solesbury Township, 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1982); Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. State of Cal., 601 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1979). See infra notes 124-33 and
accompanying text. Zoning and related forms of land use controls are an exercise of the police
power which is vested in the states. However, very few state legislatures exercise the power of
zoning themselves. Instead, by means of state enabling legislation or constitutional provisions,
the states have delegated their authority to zone and impose other land use controls to local
governments. To date, a few states (notably Florida, Hawaii, New Jersey, California, Oregon,
Kentucky, Nebraska and Vermont) have adopted comprehensive planning legislation which
requires local governments to link their implementation programs to local comprehensive
plans. However, such legislative schemes generally do not provide for state administrative control of local land use planning and regulation programs. See generally, D. HAGMAN AND JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW (2d ed. 1986).
75. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1959). See
also, Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. II1. 1981).
76. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
77. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
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than stayed. 78

Section 1983 land use cases in which the federal courts have
applied Younger abstention are limited to those few instances in
which there has been a pending state proceeding involving essentially
the same issues as are presented in the federal court proceeding.79
C.

Intersection of the Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines

The ripeness and abstention doctrines are similar in that they
both provide ground rules for the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. However, the distinction between these two doctrines is important: the former governs whether a federal court may, under article
III of the Constitution, exercise subject matter jurisdiction, while the
latter is a judge-made rule by which the court in its discretion, determines whether the court should exercise subject matter jurisdiction
in a particular case. Judicial recognition of this distinction has obvious procedural consequences. Ripeness determines whether the court
has the power to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. If a matter is
determined not to be ripe for adjudication, then there is no need to
reach the question of abstention. In the wake of the Supreme Court's
recent land use decisions involving ripeness" and the taking issue,8 1
the combined exclusionary impact of the ripeness doctrine and the
abstention doctrine (particularly the Pullman abstention doctrine) is
becoming apparent. Indeed, the two doctrines intersect at a logical
point of concern to a federal court: at the second prong of the ripeness doctrine (i.e., whether the plaintiff has sought "just" compensation through available state procedures), and the "unsettled question
78. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976).
79. See e.g., Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Central Avenue
News v. City of Minot, North Dakota, 651 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1981) (pending state court
proceeding to enforce zoning and licensing ordinances).
80. See discussion of ripeness cases supra.
81. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that
a Pennsylvania law which required mining companies to retain 50 percent of their coal in the
ground to prevent subsidence did not effect a taking of property because the regulation served
a valid public safety purpose); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that where the application of a regulation deprives the
landowner of all or virtually all beneficial use of the property, mere invalidation of the regulation is not a constitutionally sufficient remedy; compensation must be paid for both permanent
and temporary regulatory takings); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987) (holding that a requirement that landowners grant a public access easement across
their property as a condition of building permit approval amounted to a permanent physical
invasion and therefore constituted a taking for which compensation was required, and holding
further that the purpose of the condition, namely, to protect coastal vistas and ensure public
access to the beach did not "substantially advance" a "legitimate state interest.").
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of state law" consideration of Pullman abstention. This is because
the availability of an adequate state remedy for inverse condemnation (an issue of ripeness) can itself become the unsettled question of
state law which may warrant abstention by the federal court.
This convergence of these two aspects is illustrated in the recent
case of Northern Virginia Law School v. City of Alexandria,8 2 involving a section 1983 taking claim brought by the law school for the
city's refusal to rezone school property from residential to commercial. The district court dismissed the complaint on both ripeness and
abstention grounds stating:
Virginia law ...provides an inverse condemnation remedy ... The
fact that no Virginia state court has yet decided whether the statutory remedy may be used to redress regulatory takings, as opposed
to physical invasions of property, does not preclude the application
of the Williamson rule to this case. [footnote omitted] Under Williamson, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the
state procedure is inadequate or unavailable. [Citations omitted]
The plaintiff here has not met that burden....
The second ground for dismissal-abstention-is closely related to the ripeness issue. Central to both is the existence of a
dispositive state remedy or issue.... [T]he existence of the dispositive and novel issue under Virginia law concerning the meaning of
[the state inverse condemnation provision] is a factor that should
be given substantial weight in determining whether abstention is
appropriate.... The Court finds that the principles of both [Pull83
man and Burford] cases militate in favor of abstention here.
This convergence of the two doctrines can be expected to appear increasingly in the federal courts' analyses of taking claims in land use
cases. The implication of this doctrinal convergence for property
owners is that the threshold jurisdictional determination of ripeness
will trigger and often reinforce the reasoning of a federal court
which believes that it should abstain in land use disputes.

II.

TRENDS AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS IN APPLYING THE
RIPENESS AND ABSTENTION DOCTRINES TO LAND USE CASES

A.

An Overview

In the period since the Supreme Court's decisions on ripeness in
Hamilton Bank and MacDonald, the lower federal courts generally
82.
83.

680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).
Id. at 224-25 (emphasis added).
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have attempted to refine the ripeness doctrine, particularly the "finality" requirement. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have been the
most active in attempting to apply the ripeness doctrine to landowners' suits, rendering a combined total of 18 ripeness decisions,8 4 almost all involving section 1983 claims. 85 Of the remaining circuits,
the First, Seventh, and Eighth have been the most active, rendering
a total of 10 decisions.8 6 A total of 36 ripeness decisions concerning
land use have been rendered by the federal district courts since
1983.87 Of these, plaintiffs have suffered dismissal in approximately
94 percent of the decisions. 8 (Figure 1) Of the cases ordering dismissal, 26 percent have been on based on the finality requirement of
the ripeness doctrine;8 9 56 percent have been based upon the plaintiff's failure to utilize available state procedures to seek "just" compensation, 90 and 18 percent of the dismissals were based on both
prongs of the ripeness doctrine.9 (Figure 2)
Figure 1
Federal Court Ripeness Decisions
All Land Use Cases. 1983-1988"

Taking Claim Held Ripe (5.6%)

Taking Claim Held Unripe (94.4%)

84. See appendix at 137-40, figures 1 and 2.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See appendix, at 137-42.
90. Id.
91. See Id.
* For a listing of specific cases, see appendix at 137.
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Reasons for Ripeness Dismissal
All Land Uae Cases, 1983-1988'

o Final Deciuuon (26.5%)

ate Procedures Unused (55.9%)

Both Prongs Unsatisfied (17.6%)

In the area of abstention, a review of section 1983 federal court
land use actions since 1974 reveals that the courts have chosen to
abstain under one or more of the abstention doctrines in close to fifty
percent of the cases. (Figure 3)" The percentage is about the same
for land use cases that involve allegations of constitutional violations.
(Figure 4)."

* For a listing of specific cases, see appendix at 140.
92. See appendix at 143.
93. See appendix at 146. Because, judicial pronouncements notwithstanding, the federal
courts appear to apply the principles of abstention to land use cases without particular regard
to whether a case is brought as a § 1983 action, the summary of abstention trends within the
circuits (presented in Part Ill B below) has been broadened to include land use cases
generally.
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Figur 3
Federal Court Abstention Decisions
All § 1983 Land Use Ca.e,

1972-1988

Abetentioni Declined (51.2%)

Abstention Ordered (48.8%)

Figure 4
Federal Court Abstention Decisions
All Land Use Case., 1972-1988 *

Abstention Declined t48.8)
Abste-tiont

* For a listing of specific cases,
see Appendix at 143.
** For a listing of specific

cases, see Appendix at 146.

Ordered 151.2%)
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As noted above, the ripeness doctrine has two prongs that correspond to the two questions raised by a takings claim: (1) whether the
local government's decision is sufficiently "final" so that a court can
decide whether the'regulation has gone so far that it is a taking; (2)
whether the landowner sought and was denied "just" compensation
for the regulatory taking through available state inverse condemnation procedures. It is the second prong of the ripeness doctrine upon
which most property owners' takings claims have become impaled.
1. Failure to Utilize Available State Compensation Procedures.-Before even reaching the "finality" question, most lower federal courts have found it a simple matter to dismiss takings claims,
because the property owner failed to seek "just" compensation
through available state procedures. 4 Even when the state law remedy for seeking "just" compensation is unclear or undeveloped, the
courts have generally been unsympathetic and ordered dismissal despite the injustice or hardship caused by such retroactive decisions.9"
The Ninth Circuit noted in Austin that the justification for such retroactive dismissals is that lack of ripeness means that the court is
without jurisdiction to hear the claim and, therefore, such a jurisdictional ruling, by definition, cannot be prospective only.9"
2. The Finality Requirement.-The "finality" requirement has
been the most troublesome for the lower federal courts to apply.
Some judges have openly admitted their difficulty in determining
"when enough is enough" under this requirement."7 None of the judicial pronouncements on finality provide any reliable method for determining when an application is truly "meaningful" and reapplication is not necessary for a takings claim or any other claim to be ripe
for consideration. Defining the reapplication requirement of the finality rule for a takings claim may not be possible beyond the partic94. See Boothe v. Manatee County, 812 F.2d 1372 (1lth Cir. 1987); Four Seasons
Apartment v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1985); Jackson Court Condominiums v. City of New Orleans, 665 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D.La. 1987); Carroll v. City of
Prattville, 653 F. Supp. 933 (M.D. Ala. 1987); HMK Corp. v. County of Chesterfield, 616 F.
Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1985).
95. Austin v. City and County of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 136 (1988); Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (Ist Cir.
1987), affd, 847 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988); Mitchell v. Mills County, 673 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.
Iowa 1987); Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986).
96. 840 F.2d at 682.
97. See. e.g., Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City and County of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926, 941
n.18 (D. Hawaii 1986); HMK Corp. v. County of Chesterfield, 616 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va.
1985).
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ular facts of each case. However, in a few recent decisions the federal courts have applied the MacDonald reapplication requirement
more cautiously, underscoring the differences between takings claims
and other claims such as substantive due process, procedural due
process and equal protection.
The Supreme Court's language in MacDonald suggested that
the ripeness doctrine applies not only to takings claims, but also to
substantive due process, equal protection and procedural due process
claims that may accompany the takings claim:
Whether the inquiry asks if the regulation has "gone too far," or
whether it seeks to determine if proferred compensation is "just,"
no answer is possible until a court knows what use, if any, may be
made of the affected property.
Our cases uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the
constitutionalityof the regulations that purport to limit it.98
Most of the lower federal courts have focused upon the second sentence and, where they have found the taking claim to be unripe, have
dismissed substantive due process, equal protection and procedural
due process claims as equally unripe. 99
A "procedural" due process claim raises the question of whether
the local government followed constitutionally mandated procedures
as to notice and opportunity to be heard in making a regulatory decision. The few federal court decisions that have sought to apply the
ripeness doctrine to procedural due process claims have concluded
that the final decision requirement applies.100 These courts reason
that it is impossible to evaluate the adequacy of challenged procedures before a plaintiff has availed himself of those procedures. 0 1
This reasoning is correct under the principles of the ripeness doctrine
except in those cases where a plaintiff can demonstrate that the "futility" exception applies. However, the reapplication requirement
should never apply. In assessing a procedural due process claim, the
98. 477 U.S. at 350-351 (emphasis added).
99. See Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, modified, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir.
1987) cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 775 (1988); Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770
(7th Cir. 1988); Ochoa Realty v. Faria, 815 F.2d 812 (Ist Cir. 1987); Barancik v. Marin
County, No. 85-3848, slip op. at 5-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1987); Golemis v. Kirby, 632 F.
Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1985).
100. See, Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1988); Kinzli v.
City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, modified, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 108
S.Ct. 775 (1988).
101. See, e.g., Kinzli, 818 F.2d 1449.
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courts should examine a local government's specific actions during a
particular application process, not the "nature and intensity" of the
landowner's development proposal.
B.

The Circuits

In the following analysis of the application of the ripeness and
abstention doctrines within each circuit, the ripeness doctrine is addressed first, as it is the threshold jurisdictional question which
should be addressed first by a federal court in order to determine if
it has the power to proceed to the merits of a claim.""2
1. First Circuit. 1°a-The ripeness decisions in the First Circuit
have all been decided upon the second prong of the ripeness doctrine,
namely, the failure of the plaintiff to have sought and been denied
"just" compensation for the alleged regulatory taking through available state inverse condemnation procedures.' Even when the state
law remedy for seeking just compensation is unclear or undeveloped,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has been unsympathetic
and ordered dismissal. Dismissal has been ordered despite the apparent injustice or hardship caused by such retroactive decisions. 05 The
ripeness decisions within this circuit have not distinguished regulatory takings claims from substantive due process claims. For example, in Golemis, the plaintiff did not seek damages but limited his
claim to declaratory and injunctive relief under a substantive due
process theory. In the view of the court, the plaintiff's distinction
between remedies was a "periphrastic strawman" -irrelevant to the
ripeness question, since "ripeness concerns apply to the prosecution
of actions per se, not to a party's choice of remedy."'0 6
Where Pullman abstention has been applied in land use cases
102. Unfortunately, not all courts have sought to address ripeness as a preliminary jurisdictional question, which, if answered in the negative, prevents the court from proceeding to
the merits. See Barancik v. Matin County, No. 85-3848 slip op. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1987),
affd, Barancik v. Matin County, No. 87-1982 (9th Cir. June 30, 1988), opinion amended
(April 19, 1989), rehearing denied (June 6, 1989). See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. The First Circuit includes the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island and Puerto Rico.
104. See, Ochoa Realty Corp. v. Faria, 815 F.2d 812 (lst Cir. 1987); Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (Ist Cir. 1987); Golemis v. Kirby, 632 F. Supp. 159

(D.R.I. 1985).
105. See, e.g., Culebras Enter. Corp, 813 F.2d 506 (Ist Cir. 1987) (where plaintiff's land
was frozen from the years 1975-1984).
106. Golemis, 632 F. Supp. at 164 (paraphrasing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974)).
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by the federal courts within the First Circuit, the courts have been
consistent in defining Pullman as requiring state court resolution of
an unsettled issue of state law that could obviate the need for a decision on the federal claim. In applying the doctrine, the courts have
primarily analyzed whether the challenged statute or ordinance is
facially ambiguous. If the statute is not ambiguous, they have not
10 7
abstained.
The First Circuit courts have consistently held that Burford abstention should apply only where federal adjudication would disrupt
a complex, coherent and comprehensive regulatory system.' 08 Despite the readiness of courts in the First Circuit to find lack of subject matter jurisdiction on ripeness grounds, there does not appear to
be a significant inclination on the part of the First Circuit to abstain
from deciding land use cases absent some unresolved issue of state
law, such as the construction of a state enabling statute or the constitutionality of development moratoria.' 0 9 Between 1972 and 1988
courts in the First Circuit ordered abstention in approximately 43
percent of all land use cases, and in 40 percent of the land use cases
brought under section 1983.110
2. Second Circuit. " ' To date, only one district court in the
Second Circuit has applied the ripeness doctrine to a case involving
land use, a case in which plaintiff's building permit was revoked for
their failure to apply for a certificate of no harassment." 2 That failure, ruled the court, foreclosed the plaintiffs from alleging that the
revocation of their permit constitute a final determination sufficient
to satisfy the finality requirement of the ripeness doctrine." 3
The courts of the Second Circuit have decided more land use
cases on abstention grounds. The principal abstention doctrine used
in the Second Circuit in deciding land use cases has been the Pullman doctrine. Pullman abstention has been defined within the circuit
107. See Chan v. Town of Brookline, 484 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Mass. 1980); Hotel Coamo
Springs v. Hernadez Colon, 426 F. Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976). But cf., Druker v. Sullivan, 458
F.2d 1272 (Ist Cir. 1972).
108. See Urbanizadora Versalles. Inc. v. Rivera Rios. 701 F.2d 993, 997 (Ist Cir. 1983);
Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanborton, 335 F. Supp. 947, 952 (D.N.H. 1971), aff'd on
other grounds, 469 F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1972).
109. See Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272 (Ist Cir. 1972). See also Coombs v. Town
of Ogunquit, 578 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Me. 1984).
110. See appendix at 148-49 and 152, respectively.
I ll. The Second Circuit includes the states of Connecticut, New York and Vermont.
112. Weissman v. Fruchtman, 700 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
113. Id. at 753-54.
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as a doctrine requiring state court resolution of a state law issue in
order to obviate the need to decide federal constitutional questions."" The federal courts in the Second Circuit have declined to
abstain where construction of the statute at issue or the state enabling legislation is not ambiguous.11 5 The courts have also refused to
abstain where the construction of the ordinance in question would
not resolve the federal constitutional issues." 6
Burford abstention was considered but not applied in Lerner v.
Town of Islip,"7 In the view of the Court, the zoning in the state
had no single source of state, judicial or administrative control." 8
The court in Lerner also expressed the view that while some federal
courts choose to abstain from zoning cases, "most federal courts decide zoning disputes . . . without referring to the abstention doc-

trine."1 9 Between 1972 and 1988, the courts in the Second Circuit
ordered abstention in 50 percent of all land use cases, and in 50
percent of the land use cases brought under section 1983.12
3. Third Circuit.- 21-The Third Circuit, to date, has addressed
the ripeness issue as applied to land use in only one published decision, Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 22 involving a
claim for monetary relief after a state court had invalidated as illegal spot zoning the township's rezoning of 37 of plaintiff's 146 acres
from industrial to agricultural use and ordered the township to approve or deny the plaintiff's previously submitted plans on the basis
of the ordinance in effect prior to the rezoning. Because the plaintiff's taking claim was based upon other aspects of the new ordinance, but it had never applied for development approval under the
new ordinance, the court had little difficulty finding that the claim
was premature under Agins v. Tiburon. 23
114. See Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 416 U.S. I (1974); Lerner v. Town of Islip, 272 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
115. See Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 416 U.S. I (1974); Town of Springfield v. State of Vermont Envtl. Bd., 521 F. Supp.
243 (D.Vt. 1981).
116. See Hill Constr. Co. v. Connecticut, 366 F. Supp. 737 (D. Conn. 1973).
117. 272 F. Supp. 664, 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
118. Id. at 665.
119. Id. at 666.
120. See appendix at 152 and 156, respectively.
121. The Third Circuit includes the states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware.
122. 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1987). See also, Doerinkel v. Hillsborough Township, No.
86-1823 (D.N.J. May 25, 1988) (Westlaw, DCT database; 1988 WL 54662) (taking claim
held unripe for failure to utilize state inverse condemnation procedures).
123. Id. at 1029.
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There are more cases on abstention within the Third Circuit.
However, these cases reveal little consistency in their outcomes. The
cases define the Pullman doctrine as one requiring abstention where
an unsettled question of state law could be resolved that would either
moot the federal constitutional question or change the light within
which it would be viewed." 4
In both Heritage Farms' and Sixth Camden, 2 6 the courts
held that Burford abstention applies where a case touches on difficult and important state policy questions. However, in neither case
did the court decide to abstain. In Sixth Camden, the court found no
questions of state law before it.' 2 ' In Heritage Farms, the court decided that the lack of uniform statewide land use policy demon128
strated that there was no threat of disrupting state policy.
In Amico, the court held that Burford abstention applied to
cases "where the subject matter of the action is also highly complex
and unique."129 However, this court refused to abstain on Burford
grounds because the zoning ordinance in question was, in its view,
simple and raised narrow issues.130
The inconsistency in the Third Circuit may be due to the fact
that the cases, to date, have involved more than straight-forward
land use issues. For example, the Heritage Farms case involved
fraud and conspiracy under § 1983.131 In Sixth Camden and Hovsons, there were parallel pending state court actions. In Bodor v.
East Coventry Township, 32 the court refused to abstain because the
town was charging prohibitively high filing fees, which made the administrative remedies at the local level unavailable to the plaintiff.
Between 1972 and 1988 the courts in the Third Circuit ordered abstention in 27 percent of all land use cases, and in-22 percent of land
124. See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solesbury Township, 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1982);
Amico v. New Castle County, 553 F. Supp. 738 (D. Del. 1982); Hovsons, Inc. v. Secretary of
the Interior, 519 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.J. 1981); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township,
Burlington County, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976); Salvati v. Dale, 364 F. Supp. 691 (W.D.
Pa. 1973).
125. 671 F.2d 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1982).
126. 420 F. Supp. 709, 720 (D.N.J. 1976).
127. 420 F. Supp. at 720.
128. 671 F.2d at 746.
129. 553 F. Supp. at 744 (citing Sante Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula
Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1979)).
130. Id. at 744.
131. 671 F.2d at 748.
132. 325 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
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use cases brought under section 1983.13
4.

Fourth Circuit.134 Two land use regulatory cases have been

dismissed on ripeness grounds in the Fourth Circuit: Northern Virginia Law School v. City of Alexandria, 3' and Wintercreek Apart3 6 In Northern
ments v. City of St. Peters."
Virginia Law School,
"
discussed previously, ' the school's taking claim was based on a denial of their request to have property rezoned from residential to

commercial use. The court dismissed the-claim for lack of ripeness
because the school had failed to utilize the inverse condemnation
remedy provided under Virginia law. " 8
Failure to utilize the available inverse condemnation remedy

was also a ground for dismissal in the Wintercreek Apartments
case.139 However, in that case the plaintiffs had also failed to revise
their development proposal to comply with the requirements of an
amendment to the city's zoning ordinance, which was adopted prior
to the approval of the plaintiff's proposal. When the city refused to
give further consideration to the development plans, the plaintiffs
sued, alleging that the amended ordinance effected a taking of their
property. Citing Hamilton Bank, the Wintercreek court reasoned

that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy their finality requirement of
the ripeness doctrine because they had not sought a variance which
was available under the zoning ordinance. "'
Similar to the Ninth Circuit, discussed below, there is a strong

judicial preference in the Fourth Circuit to abstain in land use cases.
The two principal cases which reflect the abstention reasoning within
133. See appendix at 152 and 157, respectively.
134. The Fourth Circuit includes the states of North Carolina; South Carolina; Virginia
and West Virginia.
135. 680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).
136. 682 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Mo. 1988). A third case, HMK Corp. v. County of Chesterfield, 616 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1985), involved a claim that a quick-take condemnation
procedure was used by the Virginia Department of Housing & Transportation (VDH & T) to
acquire property for the private use of another corporation; the court held that until the fee
simple interest in the plaintiff's property had been granted by the state court, the defeasible
fee interest in the property under the quick-take statute was not a "final" taking under the rule
of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985). The court went further and held that Hamilton Bank was also applicable to the private versus public use issue under the fifth amendment's taking clause. Id. at 669. Therefore,
until the state court resolved that issue through the available condemnation procedure, the
matter was not ripe for adjudication. Id.
137. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
138. 680 F. Supp. at 224-25.
139. 682 F. Supp. at 993.
140. Id. at 991-93.
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the Fourth Circuit are Fralin and Waldorn, Inc. v. City of Martinsville 1"1 and Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith."' These cases reflect a judicial tendency to apply the combined reasoning of the Burford and the Pullman doctrines to reach the decision to abstain. In
neither of these cases did the court require that the state law be
uncertain or unsettled. The courts in these cases have characterized
land use policy as a particularly sensitive local matter. They defer to
the state courts' extensive "expertise and experience"'' M with land
use matters to determine whether local land use activities are reasonable and otherwise valid under state law and the federal
Constitution.' 4
One of the Fourth Circuit's land use decisions that reflect this
combined Pullman-Burford approach to abstention is Meredith v.
Talbot County. 45 The case involved a developer's attempt to have
development restrictions on a portion of its subdivision waived after
the developer had agreed to the restrictions in order to ensure approval before the imposition of a moratorium. The request was denied by the County's Board of Appeals and the developer filed an
action in the federal district court seeking compensatory damages for
an alleged "taking" of its property. The district court ruled that abstention was required under both the Pullman and Burford doctrines. The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that Pullman abstention was proper because the county's decision to impose the
development restrictions was based upon a new state environmental
protection law for the Chesapeake Bay area which had not yet been
interpreted by the Maryland courts. 4 In also upholding abstention
under the Burford doctrine, the court concluded that "[t]he procedures, programs, statutes, regulations, planning boards and officials
involved in the subdivision approval process" were sufficient to
"qualify zoning in Talbot County, Maryland as being governed by a
complex state regulatory scheme." 47 Between 1972 and 1988, the
courts in the Fourth Circuit ordered abstention in 60 percent of all
land use cases, and in 40 percent of land use cases brought under
141. 370 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973). afld, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974).
142. 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978).
143. Fralin and Waldon, 370 F. Supp. at 191; Kent Island, 452 F. Supp. at 463.
144. But see Donohoc Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978).
145. 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987).
146. Id. at 232.
147. Id.
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section 1983.148
5. Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. 9 The newly formed Eleventh
Circuit has addressed the ripeness issue with the most frequency. 50
It has also further refined the "finality" requirement of the doctrine.
However, only three of these cases have involved regulatory taking

claims." The Fifth Circuit, while yielding only one ripeness decision
to date, 5 ' has been consistent with courts of the Eleventh Circuit,
when analyzing claims for ripeness, in distinguishing between types
of claims. For example, in Carroll v. City of Prattville"s the district
court reviewed inverse condemnation and substantive due process
claims arising out of the city's alleged refusal to rezone the plaintiff's
property. The court dismissed the taking claim under the first prong
of the ripeness doctrine, namely, plaintiff's failure to utilize Alabama's post-taking remedy for an inverse condemnation action.1"
However, the district court in Carrolldid not conclude that the prematurity of the taking claim caused the substantive due process
claim to be unripe as well. Rather, it considered the claim separately, and denied the city's motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim.1

55

Similarly, in Jackson Court Condominiums,

56

which involved a

148. See appendix at 153 and 157-58, respecitively.
149. The Fifth Circuit includes the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. The Eleventh Circuit includes the states of Alabama, Florida and Georgia. The Eleventh Circuit was
formed in 1980.
150. Boothe v. Manatee County, 812 F.2d 1372, reh'g denied, 818 F.2d 871 (11 th Cir.
1987); Anthony v. Franklin County, 799 F.2d 681, reh'g denied, 804 F.2d 681 (11 th Cir.
1986); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
662 F. Supp. 1465 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
151. Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11 th Cir. 1987); Carroll v. City
of Prattville, 653 F. Supp. 933 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Bernstein v. Holland, 657 F. Supp. 233
(M.D. Ga. 1987).
152. Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 665 F. Supp. 1235
(E.D. La. 1987).
153. 653 F. Supp. 933 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
154. Id. at 942. The court also considered the defendant's request that it abstain, but
only as to plaintiff's remaining substantive due process claim. It declined to abstain on Pullman abstention grounds, noting that the plaintiff was not challenging the authority of the city
to zone newly annexed property, but only its exercise of that authority under the substantive
due process clause, and therefore there was no unsettled question of state law, the disposition
of which would avoid the constitutional issue. See Id. at 939-40.
155. Id. at 944. But cf., Bernstein v. Holland, 657 F. Supp. 233 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (both
taking and substantive due process claims dismissed as premature where plaintiff challenged
passage of amendment to zoning ordinance before seeking "variance" from the terms of the
ordinance).
156. 665 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. La. 1987).
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challenge on taking, substantive due process and equal protection
grounds to an ordinance prohibiting time sharing condominium
projects, the District Court for the Eastern District of Alabama dis18 7
missed the taking claim on ripeness grounds only.
In contrast to most of the other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit
has articulated at least one standard for determining when the "futility" exception to the finality requirement has been satisfied. In
Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,1 8 the challenged ordinances imposed a complete moratorium on the development of the plaintiff's
property. "Finality," said the court, "is manifested by a showing that
there is no beneficial use to which the property may be put, as determined, for instance, by the request and denial of a variance....
The court held that any request for a variance "would plainly have
been futile" because of the moratorium.1 60
One district court in the Eleventh Circuit has applied the reasoning in Hamilton Bank to extend the second requirement of the
ripeness doctrine--utilizing available state procedures--to procedural due process claims. In East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v. Macon-Bibb Planning & Zoning Commission,6 ' the plaintiffs filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the county
planning & zoning commission's granting of a conditional use permit
to the defendant to operate a sanitary land fill in the plaintiffs'
neighborhood constituted a denial of procedural due process under
the applicable zoning regulations. Because the ordinance provided
that any procedural requirements that were not followed by the commission were reviewable in state court, the court held that before the
plaintiffs' claim was "ripe" for adjudication in a federal court, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the "the procedural safeguards set
up by the zoning regulations themselves are futile or inadequate as a
1 62
matter of law."
With respect to the application of the abstention doctrine, there
appears to be a tendency within the old Fifth Circuit to abstain automatically from land use cases. The courts of the circuit have de157. Id. at 1242, 1250-54. The court also dismissed the other two claims, not because
they were unripe, but because each failed to state a claim.
158. 816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987).
159. Id. at 1516.
160. Id. This test is similar to that expressed in dictum by the Ninth Circuit. Norco
Constr., Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 212, 213
and accompanying text.
161. 662 F. Supp. 1465 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
162. Id. at 1467.
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fined Pullman as requiring abstention where a state court could resolve an uncertain question of the state law so as to avoid federal
adjudication of a constitutional question.16 The courts were confronted by state statutes that were subject to interpretation and had
yet to be construed by state courts. Dome involved Florida's condominium laws, which the court found to be exceptionally important to
the state's growth management efforts."" In P.C. Utilities, Florida's
sewage treatment facility permitting laws were at issue, and the
court noted that "even the attorney general is unsure" of the interpretation of those laws.1 65 These state law circumstances under Florida Law led the courts to abstain in both cases. The courts in this
circuit have viewed land use questions as being fundamentally of local concern and therefore outside the competence and supervisory
power of the federal courts.
Nasser v. City of Homewood'" is one of the recent land use
decisions that has come from the newly formed Eleventh Circuit.
Nasser contrasts with the trend of the old Fifth Circuit cases. The
court in Nasser refused to abstain under Pullman abstention because
there was no unsettled issue of state law. 167 It also refused to apply
Burford abstention because the state had provided no single forum
for resolving land use disputes and there was no state interest in uniformity that would be disrupted by federal review of zoning ordinances.1 68 It appears that Nasser will serve as the standard for future abstention decisions in the Eleventh Circuit. 69 Between 1972
and 1988 the courts in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits ordered abstention in 75 percent of all land use cases, but in none of the land
use cases brought under section 1983.170
6. Sixth Circuit.m'-The Sixth Circuit, to date, has addressed
the ripeness issue in only one decision, Four Seasons Apartment v.
163. See Hill v. City of El Paso, 437 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1971); Dome Condominium
Ass'n v. Goldenberg, 442 F. Supp. 438 (S.D. Fla. 1977); P.C. Util. Corp. v. Division of Health
of Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 339 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Fla. 1972), affd without
opinion, 472 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1973).
164. 442 F. Supp. at 446-47.
165. 339 F. Supp. at 919.
166. 671 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 1982).
167. Id. at 439.
168. Id. at 440.
169. See Carroll v. City of Prattville, 653 F. Supp. 933, 940 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
170. See appendix at 152 and 156, respectively.
171. The Sixth Circuit includes the states of Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.
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City of Mayfield Heights. 2 The case involved the rescission of an
apartment building permit by the city three years after it was issued
because of sewage and drainage problems that had developed in the
project area. The developers sued under section 1983, seeking a writ
of mandamus, declaratory relief and damages for a taking, and al-

leging a procedural due process violation because the rescission was
done without calling a hearing in advance of the notice of rescission.
The court dismissed the taking claim as premature under Williamson because the plaintiffs had not availed themselves of state procedures to test their right to just compensation.1' The court, however,

did not apply the ripeness test to the procedural due process claim,
finding instead that because there was no established state or local
policy or procedure governing local building permits, the plaintiffs
did not present a valid constitutional claim.'17 The Sixth Circuit de-

cision is one of a handful of ripeness cases involving procedural due
process claims in which the courts have addressed the adequacy of
such claims separately, without discussing the applicability of the

ripeness doctrine to procedural due process. 7
No one single case in the Sixth Circuit that provides the con-

trolling principles of abstention in land use cases. The cases refer to
Pullman abstention as abstention where the federal constitutional issues may be mooted or modified by state court interpretation of state
law.1' The decisions in these cases appear to be based more upon a

mixture of policies underlying abstention rather than upon specific
precedent within the circuit. Between 1972 and 1988, the courts in
the Sixth Circuit ordered abstention in 80 percent of all land use
cases, and in all land use cases brought under section 1983."
172. 775 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1985).
173. Id. at 152.
174. Id.
175. See Littlefield v. City of Aflton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986); Jacobs v. City of
Minneapolis, No. 4-87-397 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 1987) (unpublished decision available on
WESTLAW, DCT database); Mitchell v. Mills County, 673 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Iowa 1987),
affid, 847 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988). In those cases in which the federal courts have discussed
the applicability of the ripeness doctrine to procedural due process claims, the courts have
concluded that the final decision requirement of the doctrine does apply because it is impossible to evaluate the adequacy of challenged procedures before a plaintiff has availed herself of
those procedures. See Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1988); Kinzli
v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, modified on other grounds, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 775 (1988).
176. See Muskegan Theatres v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1974); Danish News Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 517 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Mich. 1981), affd without opinion,
751 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984).
177. See appendix at 152 and 156, respectively.
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7. Seventh Circuit.' 74--The Seventh Circuit appears to have
followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit on the ripeness issue, particularly with respect to that circuit's analytical approach to the finality
requirement. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake,17 9 the first antitrust
case to result in an actual award of damages by a federal jury
(treble damages of $28.5 million), was appealed to the Seventh Circuit following the trial court's granting of the defendants' motion for
JNOV. The case involved the alleged conspiracy of the county and
certain municipalities to deny sewer service to the property in order
to block the plaintiffs development. However, because the plaintiff
developer had never in fact made a formal application for a sewer
connection, the Seventh Circuit, citing the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Herrington v. County of Sonoma,"' dismissed the complaint as
premature.1 81 In all of their other ripeness decisions, the courts in
the Seventh Circuit have dismissed the plaintiffs' taking claims for
failure to utilize available state procedures to seek just
compensation.1 81
In one of the two circuit court abstention decisions involving
land use, Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 8 3 the court defined two circumstances where "principles of equity, comity and federalism" call for
abstention: (1) where there are pending state court proceedings in
which the federal claims before the federal court can be promptly
adjudicated and (2) where a state court could construe the state statute being attacked in federal court so as to avoid or modify the constitutional questions.18" The Ahrensfeld court abstained because related state proceedings were still pending, and because the state
supreme court had not yet issued a dispositive interpretation of the
state's eminent domain statutes. 88 The court also cited Hill v. City
of El Paso'8 for the proposition that the application of zoning ordi178. The Seventh Circuit includes the states of Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin.
179. 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1988).
180. 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
181. 841 F.2d at 774, 775.
182. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988);
Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Guzzo, No. 88C 2547 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 1988) (Westlaw, DCT
database; 1988 WL 123932); Muscarello v. Village of Hampshire, 644 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D.
Ill. 1986); Beachy v. Board of Aviation Comm'rs, 699 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1988)..
183. 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975). See also American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598
F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aFd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd without opinion,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
184. 528 F.2d at 197.
185. Id. at 198-99.
186. 437 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1971).
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nances is "distinctly a feature of local government . . . outside the
general supervisory power of federal courts." 6 7 By contrast, in Rasmussen v. City Lake Forest,'" the federal district court applied a
Burford-type analysis but refused to abstain because state law
"[did] not appear to coordinate the zoning ordinances of municipalities toward any particular state objectives." 1" Between 1972 and
1988, the courts in the Seventh Circuit ordered abstention in 20 percent of all land use cases and in 50 percent of the land use cases
brought under section 1983, also ordered abstention.'"
8. Eighth Circuit."'1-The ripeness decisions within the
Eighth Circuit"' are noteworthy in that, in contrast to the decisions
in other circuits, the district and circuit court decisions appear to
recognize, at least implicitly, if not explicitly, that the fate of a
plaintiff's substantive due process, equal protection and procedural
due process claims under ripeness analysis is not necessarily the
same as that of a plaintiff's taking claim which is subjected to ripeness analysis. In Littlefield, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' claims were premature both because they had not obtained a
final decision and because they had failed to pursue just compensation remedies through available state procedures.193 However, because the district court had treated the plaintiffs' substantive due
process claim alleging arbitrary and capricious action as part of the
procedural due process and taking claims and genuine issues of material fact existed, the court held that the plaintiffs had properly
stated a claim and remanded to the case to the district court to address the substantive due process claim.'" The Eighth Circuit also
reviewed the procedural due process claim separately on its merits
without applying the ripeness doctrine.1" In other ripeness decisions
within the Eighth Circuit, the courts have addressed the plaintiffs'
187. 528 F.2d at 198 n.7.
188. 404 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. III. 1975).
189. Id. at 154.
190. See appendix at 151 and 155, respectively.
191. The Eighth Circuit includes the states of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska.
192. Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986); Mitchell v. Mills County,
673 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Iowa 1987); Jacobs v. City of Minneapolis, No. 4-87-397 (D. Minn.
Aug. 4, 1987). (unpublished opinion on WESTLAW, DCT database); JBK, Inc. v. City of
Kansas City, 641 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
193. 785 F.2d at 609.
194. Id. at 599, 603-10.
195. Id. at 603.
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non-taking claims apart from the ripeness analysis and, while the
courts have often dismissed them for failure to state a claim, they
have not lumped them together and dismissed them as one with the
taking claim on ripeness grounds. 19e
In addition to declining to apply ripeness as broadly as some
other circuits, the Eighth Circuit has also generally declined to abstain in land use cases, although no particular case stands out as a
leading case. In United States v. City of Black Jack,1 9 the court
simply stated that it saw "no sound reason upon which to justify
denying the plaintiff a federal forum."1 98 In Jim Young Development
Corp. v. State Highway Commission,'" the court declined to abstain
on Pullman grounds because the state law had not provided an adequate remedy for the plaintiff's just compensation claim. 00 Both the
Marjak2 01 and People Tags202 cases, in which the courts also declined to abstain, involved first amendment claims, to which courts
historically have been reluctant to apply abstention. 0 3 Between 1972
and 1988, the courts in the Eighth Circuit ordered abstention in 63
percent of all land use cases, but ordered abstention in all of the land
use cases brought under section 1983.204
9. Ninth Circuit. 2 05-The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has had many opportunities to refine the finality requirement of
the ripeness doctrine. However, its decisions have not yet yielded any
predictable approach for plaintiff property owners. In Kinzli v. City
of Santa Cruz, 6 the Ninth Circuit established a disarmingly simple
196. See Mitchell v. Mills County, 673 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Iowa 1987), afd,847 F.2d
486 (8th Cir. 1988); Jacobs v. City of Minneapolis, No. 4-87-397 (D.Minn. Aug. 4, 1987)
(WESTLAW DCT database); JBK, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 641 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Mo.
1986).
197. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
198. Id. at 1184.
199. 56 F.R.D. 38 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
200. For cases in which the courts have abstained on the bases of Pullman and other
abstention principles, see Central Avenue News, Inc. v. City of Minot, 651 F.2d 565 (8th Cir.
1981); Corder v. City of Sherwood, 579 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Home Builders Ass'n
of Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas City, 379 F. Supp. 1316 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
201. Marjak, Inc. v. Cowling, 626 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
202. People Tags Inc. v. Jackson County Legislature, 636 F. Supp. 1345 (W.D. Mo.
1986).
203. See Holt v. City of Maumelle, 647 F. Supp. 1529, 1531 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (distinguishing Marjak Inc. v. Cowling).
204. See appendix at 151 and 155-56, respectively.
205. The Ninth Circuit includes the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
206. 818 F.2d 1449, 1454 modified, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
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formula for determining when a decision is in fact "final." Relying
upon Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,2" 7 the Ninth Circuit held that a final decision requires two
occurrences: (1) a rejected development plan; and (2) a denial of a
variance. 08 However, the difficulty is not in applying this set
formula, but in applying the "futility" exception to this rule. In Kinzli, the Ninth Circuit took as its starting point for determining futility the Supreme Court's statement in MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. County of Yolo' 0° that a plaintiff property owner must
have submitted a "meaningful application" to satisfy the "futility"
exception to the ripeness doctrine. 10 The Court in MacDonald coupled this statement with the observation that of course "[r]ejection
of exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply
that less ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews. ' Kinzli then identified disparate tests for futility which the
Ninth Circuit had articulated at various times.
In Norco Construction, Inc v. King County, 2 for example, the
court suggested in dictum that the futility exception may apply if it
is "clear beyond peradventure that excessive delay in such a final
determination [would cause] the present destruction of the property's beneficial use." 21 s Kinzli also noted that in American Savings
& Loan Association v. County of Marin,1" it had suggested that
futility might be satisfied where the planning authority had rejected
a sufficient number of prior applications. 15 The Ninth Circuit in
American Savings did not attempt to determine the precise point at
which submission is futile but did suggest that the submission and
rejection of two plans was enough for ripeness in Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City.210 Ultimately, the court in Kinzli was not
required to consider the futility exception because the plaintiffs had
abandoned their application early on and thus did not satisfy the
S.Ct. 775 (1988).
207. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
208. Kinzli at 1454. The Seventh Circuit has also adopted this approach. See, Unity
Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1988).
209. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
210. 818 F.2d at 1455.
211. 477 U.S. at 353 n.9.
212. 801 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1986).
213. Id. at 1145.
214. 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981).
215. 818 F.2d at 1454.
216. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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requirement of a "meaningful" application.""
. After the Kinzli case, the Ninth Circuit decided Herrington v.
Sonoma County,210 where the plaintiffs had initially alleged an unconstitutional taking but then abandoned their takings claim at trial.
The court held that the reapplication requirement of the ripeness
doctrine was irrelevant to plaintiffs' substantive due process and
equal protection claims. The Court, in summary, reasoned that there
are three important distinctions between substantive due process and
equal protection claims, and a takings claim: First, although both
taking claims and substantive due process claims involve a determination of whether the contested action was a reasonable and proper

exercise of police power, the test for reasonableness under the takings clause is less deferential to the local government's decision making authority than the test for reasonableness under substantive due
process. 19 Second, a government's regulatory action may be a legitimate exercise of the police power and still constitute a taking. Proof
that a regulatory decision "goes too far" does not require a showing
that the decision is arbitrary or irrational. 220 Third, unlike a damages award from a taking claim for inverse condemnation, a damages award, if appropriate under a substantive due process claim,
does not necessarily cover the period of time during which the prop22
erty owner was denied use of the property. 1
Substantive due process and equal protection claims challenge
the rationality of a regulatory decision and do not require proof that
all use of a landowner's land has been denied. The Herrington court
reasoned that the plaintiff's claims did not require speculation as to
what forms of less intensive development might have been permitted
by the local government."' To date, only a few federal courts in the
other circuits have declined to apply the reapplication requirement to
2 23
substantive due process and equal protection claims.
Unfortunately, after making this credible attempt to address the
scope and relevance of the reapplication requirement to non-taking
217. See also Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. San Luis Obispo County, 830 F.2d 977,
980 (9th Cir. 1987) (informal application did not constitute a "meaningful application" for
purposes of the futility exception).
218. 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
219. Id. at 1498 n.7.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1498, 1499.
223. See Carroll v. City of Prattville, 653 F. Supp. 933 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Oberndorf v.
City of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo. 1986).
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claims, the Herrington court, upon petition for rehearing, retreated
from the position it had articulated. In an amended opinion, the
panel eliminated the analysis summarized above and in its stead substituted the statement: "Our decisions in this area have also clarified
that we will apply the same ripeness standards to equal protection
and substantive due process claims." 2 4 The court's amended opinion
leaves uncertain the relevance of the reapplication requirement of
the finality doctrine in cases involving substantive due process and
equal protection claims only.
This doctrinal uncertainty within the Ninth Circuit was compounded seven days after the Herrington panel issued its amended
opinion, when another panel, citing to the rationale of the original
Herrington decision, emphasized that there is a different finality rule
for substantive due process claims. In Bateson v. Geisse,225 the Ninth
Circuit panel affirmed the district court's determination that the reapplication requirement is not relevant to a substantive due process
claim, stating: "A substantive due process claim does not require
proof that all use of the property has been denied, Herrington v.
County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1498 (9th Cir. 1988), but rather
that the interference with property rights was irrational or arbitrary.
Usuray v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct.
2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed 2d 752 (1976). '' 22

Although the decisions of different Ninth Circuit panels have
left the scope of the reapplication requirement under the finality doctrine unclarified, the Ninth Circuit, in Hoehne v. County of San
Benito,227 did give some further meaning to the "futility" exception
to that requirement. In Hoehne, the court, for the first time, gave
weight to evidence indicating that the local government's negative
attitude towards the plaintiffs' development proposal would have
made reapplication an "'idle and futile act' "228 The county board of
supervisors, concluded the court, had "sent a clear and, we believe,
final signal announcing their views as to the acceptable use of the
property . . . and [that] the supervisors had amended the General

Plan in a manner clearly and unambiguously adverse to the applica224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
1987).

Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569, (9th Cir. 1988).
857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1303.
870 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 535, quoting Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir.
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tion of the landowners." '2 91 The court's analysis suggests that the futility exception to the reapplication requirement can be satisfied
where the facts demonstrate that a local government, by its acts,
gives "the strongest possible, if not irrefutable, indication that [it] is
opposed" to the landowner's proposal. " '
In contrast to the approach of the other circuits to Pullman abstention, 31 the Ninth Circuit has developed a three-part test. As articulated in Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81,232 the three elements are: (1) the complaint must touch a sensitive area of social
policy into which the Federal Courts should not enter unless there is
no alternative to adjudication; (2) a definitive ruling on the State
issues by a State Court could obviate the need for constitutional adjudication by the Federal Court; and (3) the proper resolution of
potentially determinative State law issue is uncertain. 3
Regarding the first prong of the Canton test for Pullman abstention, the Ninth Circuit has held that "land use planning is a
sensitive area of social policy that meets the first requirement for
Pullman abstention. 234 The fact that the action involving land use
planning is based on 42 U.S.C. §1983 and alleges civil rights violations does not alter the court's perception that land use cases involve
a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought
not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open. "
With respect to the second and third elements of the Canton
test of Pullman abstention, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that
"it is crucial that the uncertainty in the state law be such that construction of it by the state courts might obviate, or at least delimit,
decision of the federal (constitutional) question. 23 6 In practice, the
federal courts within the Ninth Circuit have not tended to delve very
deeply into how and why particular state law may be uncertain or
how it would, in fact, obviate or alter the federal constitutional ques229. Id.
230. Id. See also Barancik v. Marin County, No. 87-1982 (9th Cir. June 30, 1988),
opinion amended (April 19, 1989) reh'g denied (June 6, 1989).
231. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
232. 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974).
233. Id. at 845. Recently, a federal district court in the Fourth Circuit applied the Canton formula in deciding a motion to abstain. See Northern Virginia Law School v. City of
Alexandria, 680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).
234. Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 565 F. Supp. (C.D. Cal. 1983), vacated 737 F.2d
830 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
.235. C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1983); Rancho Palos
Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976).
236. Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1976).
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tion. The result has been that in a significant percentage of the
cases, the federal courts within the Ninth Circuit have abstained
from deciding land use questions.137 In the few land use cases in
which the Ninth Circuit courts have declined to abstain, either the
state law was determined to be absolutely clear,2 3 8 or the case concerned allegations of malicious conduct on the part of the local government officials.23 9 Between 1972 and 1988, the courts in the Ninth
Circuit ordered abstention in 57 percent of all land use cases, and in
55 percent of land use cases brought under section 1983.24
10. Tenth Circuit." 4 1-- Of the ripeness decisions within the
Tenth Circuit," ' the Oberndorf and Landmark Land Company of
Oklahoma cases are noteworthy for the distinctions which the courts
made in their application of the ripeness doctrine to non-taking

claims. In Oberndorf, the court declined to dismiss on grounds of
ripeness a civil rights claim alleging that a city-approved urban renewal plan constituted a fifth amendment taking and a violation of
plaintiffs' substantive due process and equal protection rights under
the fourteenth amendment. 3 It was of critical importance that the

plaintiffs in this case did not seek a just compensation remedy, but
rather sought damages under section 1983 for defendants' alleged
interference with their property rights through a series of invalid and
fraudulent actions taken in bad faith under color of state law. 4 For
this reason, the court noted, if the plaintiffs were forced to execute
their state law remedy they "would be playing right into the scheme
237. See e.g., Pearl Inv. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, supra; C-Y Dev. Co. v.
City of Redlands, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 1179 (1985); Santa Fe
Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979); Sederquist v.
City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978); Newport Invs. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564
F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1977); Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092
(9th Cir. 1976).
238. Midkiff v. Tom., 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
239. Lodestar Co. v. County of Mono, 639 F. Supp. 1439 (E.D. Cal. 1986); Blodgett v.
County of Santa Cruz, 502 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
240. See appendix at 150-51, 54.
241. The Tenth Circuit includes the states of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.
242. Landmark Land Co. v. Buchanan, Nos. 85-2458, 85-2538 (10th Cir. Nov. 30,
1988) (Westlaw, DCT database; 1988 WL 126469); Amwest Investments v. City of Aurora,
701 F. Supp. 1508 (D. Colo. 1988). Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 653 F. Supp.
304 (D. Colo. 1986); Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986).
243. Oberndorf, 653 F. Supp. at 311.
244. 653 F. Supp. at 308.
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defendants [had] allegedly constructed."24 5 The court therefore reasoned that "[ft]here are no further steps available to plaintiffs which
might relieve them of the burdens created by the Urban Renewal
Plan." 2" It is this perception of futility which appears, in part, to
have guided the court in its pronouncement on ripeness, and refusal
to dismiss the taking claim. However, in explaining its denial of defendants' motion to dismiss, the court also provided the rationale for
why the substantive due process and procedural due process claims
were not rendered premature:
Plaintiffs repeat their argument that they are not asserting
their property has been taken without the payment of just compensation. As a result, a condemnation proceeding will not provide adequate relief. Further, there- is a present injury as a proximate result of defendants' conduct, irrespective of the fact that a
condemnation proceeding has not yet been instituted ...
My statements in Upah [v. Thorton Development Authority]
concerning ripeness of these claims, are applicable to this action.
Accordingly, defendants' motion with regard to this argument is
denied:
Defendants' equation of a taking with a condemnation ignores cases which have, for example, stated that unreasonable
government regulation may constitute a taking in some instances [citations omitted]. Plaintiff has alleged such unreasonable government regulation in this case. Additionally, defendants have neglected plaintiff's claims for due process
violations which have already occurred. . . . In the present
case .... plaintiff's allegations do not rest on the outcome of
the condemnation action. Rather plaintiff has asserted claims
based on actions which defendants have allegedly already
taken and which purportedly violate plaintiffs rights. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that plaintiff's claims are not ripe is
denied.'
In Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma, although the court
held that Landmark's substantive due process equal protection
claims must "follow the takings claim out the courthouse door because each centrally involved the issue of deprivation." 48 it declined
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 311(quoting Upah v. Thornton Dev. Auth., 632 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (D.
Colo. 1987)) (emphasis added).
248. Landmark Land Co. v. Buchanan, at 12-13 of 21 (Westlaw, AlIfeds).
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to dismiss the procedural due process claim. Citing the Eighth Circuit's decision in Littlefield v. City of Afton,'' the court reasoned
that even though the city's refusal to issue permits "[did] not dictate
the permitted level of development with sufficient finality," the city
could not withhold the permits without affording Landmark Land
due process. Hence, the procedural due process claim could not be
dismissed as unripe."
There have been three land use abstention decisions in the
Tenth Circuit: City of Moore v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,"' Overhill Corporation v. City of Grand Junction,'' and
Oberndorfv. City of Denver, discussed above with reference to ripeness.253 In Oberndorf,the court, with brief discussion, denied the defendants' motion to abstain under the Pullman doctrine, seemingly
because the state constitutional issues were unambiguous as to the
civil rights claim and nonexistent as to the antitrust claims.2" The
earlier cases, City of Moore and Overhill address Pullman doctrine
more fully. However, each case defines the Pullman doctrine somewhat differently. City of Moore defined the Pullman doctrine as requiring abstention where a state court's resolution of an unsettled
question of state law might avoid or modify the federal constitutional
issue. There, the court refused. to abstain where there were no unsettled state law issues and the constitutional claim would not be affected by an interpretation of state law." However, in Overhill, the
court defined Pullman as requiring abstention where a federal court
would be adjudicating the constitutionality of ambiguous state enactment before the state courts had an opportunity to interpret them.
The Overhill court abstained because it was not clear that the ordinance was valid under the state constitution enabling legislation." 6
249. 785 F.2d 596, 599-603 (8th Cir. 1986).
250. Landmark Land, at 15.
251. 699 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1983).
252. 186 F. Supp. 69 (D. Colo. 1960).
253. In a fourth case, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Schiff, 649 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D.M.
1986), involving a challenge to a state statute prohibiting retail display of sexually oriented
material harmful to minors, the court devoted a lengthy footnote to a discussion of both Pullman and Younger abstention. After concluding the Younger abstention was inapplicable to the
case before it, the court then declined to reach the question of whether Pullman abstention
was appropriate because it decided to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 10 13
n.5.
254. 653 F. Supp. at 312.
255. 699 F.2d at 510.
256. 186 F. Supp at 73. Because the Overhill case was decided in 1960, it is not included in the statistical analysis presented in Figures 5 and 6, infra.
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In sum, of the three land use cases in the Tenth Circuit in which the
court decided the abstention question, only one case, Overhill, a nonsection 1983 case, resulted in abstention.
11. D.C. Circuit."'--Only one case involving land use has
been decided on abstention grounds. In Silverman v. Barry," the
Circuit Court defined the Pullman doctrine as applicable where an
unsettled question of local law whose resolution might avoid or modify a decision on the constitutional question is present. The court
defined Burford abstention as involving difficult questions of local
law bearing on substantially important policy problems. Under the
facts of the case, the court declined to abstain because the ordinance
at issue was clear. With respect to Burford, the court stated that
abstention should not be based solely on sensitivity and the notion of
localism since federal courts "routinely decide local matters of great
sensitivity. 25
C.

The Implications

The circuit by circuit summary analysis indicates that there are
significant differences among the federal circuits, not only in their
analytical approaches to the ripeness and abstention doctrines, but
also in the frequency and scope of their application of the two doctrines in land use cases, particularly as to actions brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The ripeness doctrine, as the latest of the two doctrines to be applied in the context of land use, is still evolving. As
summarized above in figure number 2, however, there is more uniformity among the circuits in their application of this doctrine. This
is primarily because so many plaintiffs with takings claims had not
utilized available state procedures at the time of the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on ripeness in 1985 and 1986.260 Because of
the retroactive subject matter jurisdictional bar created by the Supreme Court's ripeness rule, most lower federal courts dismissed
cases without having to reach the more troublesome part of ripeness,
namely, whether the plaintiff had obtained a "final" decision. Virtually all of these dismissed complaints were brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.0
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

The D.C. Circuit has jurisdiction over the District of Columbia solely.
727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1124 n.4.
See appendix at 140.
See appendix at 137.
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It is the abstention doctrine, however, which reveals the greatest
discrepancy among the circuits. Figure 5 below presents a comparison of the circuits' section 1983 decisions involving the abstention
issue. It indicates that except for the First, Third and Tenth Circuits
and the D.C. Circuit, the federal courts have abstained in 50 percent
or more of the land use cases brought under section 1983.
ngue 5
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This outcome, contrary to the Supreme Court's admonition that abstention is a narrow exception to the general rule,26 2 indicates that
the exception has become the rule at least 50 percent of the time.
Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 6 below, when the analysis of the
abstention issue is broadened to include all land use cases, the fre*

For a listing of cases, see appendix at 152.
262. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976).
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quency of court-ordered abstention within most of the circuits
63
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The explanation most frequently given for this state of affairs in
federal civil rights litigation involving land use is that the federal
courts are reluctant to second-guess the decisions of local legislative
and administrative bodies, particularly in an area that is traditionally of local concern and to which state courts are more accustomed
than the federal courts. However, the conclusion that federal court
deference to state courts in land use matters is warranted by virtue
of the state courts' greater familiarity with local conditions is not
supported in fact nor theory.2s Such an explanation for federal court
* For a listing of specific cases, see appendix at 156.
263. See appendix at 152 and 156, respectively.
264. The United States Code of Judiciary and Judicial Procedure provides that every
federal district court judge must be a resident of the state in which he or she sits. See 28
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deference does not comport with the proper rationale for Pullman
abstention, which rests upon the existence of an unsettled question of
general state law. Nor does it conform to Burford abstention, which
was premised upon a complex, coherent and comprehensive state
regulatory scheme. Despite the lack of comprehensive regulatory
schemes of land use control in most state jurisdictions 265 and, in
many instances, the absence of any unsettled question of general
state law, the federal courts nevertheless have invoked the rationales
of these two abstention doctrines and ordered abstention in 50 percent of the cases presented. 66 In the process, the courts, particularly
those within the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, have ignored and distorted the original tests for these types of abstention.2 7 This misuse
of abstention reflects a disregard for the fundamental purpose of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and jeopardizes the future use of section 1983 by
property owners as an avenue of relief for deprivations of constitutional rights.
III.

PITFALLS FOR PROPERTY OWNERS

The developments in the federal caselaw on ripeness and abstention have not been salutary for property owners who seek redress of
violations of their constitutional rights in federal court. The following analysis outlines some of the principal problem areas for property owners under the ripeness and abstention doctrines, and assesses
the validity of various judicial positions that have created these
problems.
A.

Ripeness

As it has evolved to date, the ripeness doctrine presents significant obstacles and pitfalls for property owners that arise in the development approval process and upon judicial review.
U.S.C. § 134(b). Moreover, if, for example, an injunction was to be granted as one of the
remedies in the federal adjudication, it is established procedure in the federal courts to allow
subsequent state determinations to override any continuing injunction. A federal court can
subject its equitable decree to reopening if the state court later reaches an inconsistent construction of an underlying question of state law. See, e.g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 425-26
(1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177 (1933).
265. The states of Florida, Hawaii, and Oregon have state comprehensive planning acts.
California also has enacted various statutes governing aspects of land use, particularly in the
area of environmental legislation. However, the regulations of even these states do not exhibit
the comprehensiveness and coherency contemplated by the Court in Burford.
266. See appendix at 152 and 156, respectively.
267. See infra, notes 292-335 and accompanying text.
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1. Obstacles During the Development Approval Process.-Because of the finality requirement, a landowner must have
the financial staying power, not only to submit various proposals for
"lesser" intensities than the use originally proposed, but also to submit proposals for whatever other uses could conceivably be permitted
on the site under the local zoning ordinance. The ripeness doctrine
also invites local governments to create more complicated and timeconsuming review and approval processes. Finally, the doctrine is an
open invitation for some local government officials to do mischief.
Unscrupulous officials can easily assert, after the fact, that they
"would have been willing" to consider an intensity of use or an alternative type of use that the landowner never proposed.
If the local government repeatedly turns down what the landowner believes are meaningful applications for development, the
landowner may have no alternative but to challenge the government's position in court. However, even before the landowner challenges the denial of development approval as a taking of property, he
must first satisfy the second prong of the ripeness doctrine and seek
"just" compensation through available state procedures.
2. Pitfalls Upon Judicial Review.-If the federal courts are to
apply the finality requirement reasonably, they must find an appropriate method for determining a local government's position on the
proper nature and intensity of development-the critical basis for
determining whether or not a particular project may be developed
(i.e., whether or not the project conforms to zoning and planning
standards). Attempting to extract legislative intent from a pattern of
applications and denials for certain projects is imprecise and unsound. The court should consider only the most relevant primary
sources, including site feasibility studies, statements by officials
before and during the application process, and declarations of local
land use policies and regulations.
Properly applied, the ripeness doctrine should be used by the
court to determine if a land use claim has matured sufficiently to
warrant a decision on the merits. Ripeness determinations are based
on the article III mandate of the Constitution that there be an actual
"case or controversy" and on judicial policy considerations. 6 It is
inappropriate for a court to adjudicate the merits of such a claim by
trial or by means of summary judgment if it determines that a claim
268.

C.

RISDICTION 2D

A. MILLER & E.
§ 3532 (2d ed. 1984).

WRIGHT,

COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JU-
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is premature. Such an exercise of jurisdiction is beyond the power of
the court under article III. If the court has no jurisdiction, it has no
power to enter a judgment on the merits and must dismiss the
action. 6 9
Unfortunately, some lower federal courts have granted a motion
for summary judgment in conjunction with a dismissal on grounds of
ripeness. 7 0 Such a ruling works an injustice upon a plaintiff by causing his or her claim to be merged or barred for purposes of res judicata.2 71 Some other courts, however, have concluded that it is inappropriate to reach the merits of a claim once it has been determined
to be unripe for judicial review. 72
3. Implication for Future Taking Claims.-Because the ripeness doctrine poses such a formidable obstacle to taking claims, it
can be expected that landowners will no longer include a takings
claim in their federal court complaints. Instead, if the facts permit,
they will base their cases on such other constitutional grounds as
substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection. If a plaintiff landowner attempts to join these separate constitutional claims with a takings claim, the majority of the federal court
decisions indicate that, even where an admittedly "final" decision on
an application has been made, a federal court will likely dismiss the
entire complaint if the landowner has failed to seek approval of a
lesser intensity of use or an alternative use.273 If a landowner is
caught in the middle, having filed his or her complaint during the
period of the Supreme Court's ripeness decisions in Hamilton Bank
and MacDonald,he or she may be well advised to abandon the takings claim before trial, or, if necessary, on appeal.27 4
269.

See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL

2D §§ 2712, 2713 (2d ed. 1984).
270. Barancik v. Marin County, No. 85-3848 slip op. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25 1987), af'd,
Barancik v. Marin County, No. 87-1982 (9th Cir. 1988).
271. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 255, § 2712.
272. Cf Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1986); Union Pacific
R.R. v. Idaho, 654 F. Supp. 1236. 1244. modified. 663 F. Supp. 75, 77 (D. Idaho 1987);
Bernstein v. Holland, 657 F. Supp. 233, 235 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
273. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
274. Two cases to succeed in this approach to date are Herrington v. County of Sonoma,
834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987) (taking claim abandoned at trial). Barancik v. Marin County,
No. 87-1982 (June 30, 1988) opinion amended April 19, 1989 (taking claim abandoned on
appeal of district court order granting summary judgment). See generally, Mandelker and
Blaesser, "Applying the Ripeness Doctrine in Federal Land Use Litigation," II Zoning &
Plan. L. Rep. 49 (July-Aug. 1988).
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Abstention

The doctrine of abstention was established by the Supreme
Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.2 7 5 as a very
narrow exception to the general obligation of the federal judiciary to
hear and decide cases properly brought before it. Chief Justice John
Marshall expressed this proposition in dictum in Cohens v. Virginia 7 6 stating:
The Judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. . . . With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the [Clonstitution. 2 "
Since Pullman, the Supreme Court has continued to emphasize
that abstention is justified only in "narrowly limited special circumstances. 2 78 Otherwise, the federal courts have an obligation to exer-cise their vested jurisdiction. Pullman abstention is appropriate only
where a question of general state law is uncertain and abstention will
serve to avoid a potentially erroneous construction of the state law
by the federal court. 79 In light of the outcomes on the abstention
issue in federal land use cases, as summarized above, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the federal courts have lost sight of this
fundamental obligation, particularly in land use cases brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
1. The Exception Restated.-In Gibson v. Berryhill,2 0 the Supreme Court stated: "[W]hen confionted with issues of Constitutional dimension which implicate or depend upon unsettled questions of state law, a federal court ought to abstain and stay its
proceedings until those state law questions are definitively resolved." 28 ' In United States v. Livingston,28 2 the Court observed:
275. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
276. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Marshall. C.J.).
277. Id. at 404.
278. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). See also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509
(1972).
279. See Harmon v. Forssenius 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965).
280. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
281. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
282. 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959), affid sub noma. 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
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Regard for the interest and sovereignty of the state and the reluctance needlessly to adjudicate Constitutional issues may require
federal district court to abstain from adjudication if the parties
may avail themselves of an appropriate procedure to obtain state
83
interpretation of state laws requiringconstruction.
If there are no unsettled questions of state law, then abstention
is improper. Even where a particular issue has not been addressed by
the state courts, abstention is improper if the resolution of the state
law question is certain from other decisions or sources. 8 Nor is abstention justified where resolution of a federal question may result in
the overturning of state policy.2 8 Simply put, abstention is "the ex' 2 86
ception, not the rule.
In order for Pullman abstention to be appropriate: (1) the state
law in question must be unclear; and (2) the state law must be subject to an interpretation that will avoid the federal Constitutional
question.2 87 A federal court, to invoke abstention, must identify with
particularity the issues that are critical to the outcome of the federal
litigation and involve questions of state law that are actually un2 89 the Supreme
clear.2 88 In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
Court rejected the suggestion that Pullman abstention can be
founded on an abstract suspicion of uncertainty or on a theoretical
possibility that state court adjudication could obviate the need to
reach a federal question:
In the abstract, of course, such possibilities always exist. But the
relevant inquiry is not whether there is a bare, though unlikely,
possibility that state courts might render adjudication of the federal question unnecessary. Rather, "[w]e have frequently emphasized that abstention is not to be ordered unless the statute is of an
uncertain nature, and is obviously susceptible of a limiting construction." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251, and n. 14
(1967).29.
283. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). See also Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore,
U.S. 77, 80-87 (1975); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
284. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965); Meredith v. Winterhaven,
U.S. 228, 236-37 (1943).
285. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379-80 n.5 (1978).
286. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
(1976).
287. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967).
288. See Harman v. Forssensius, 380 U.S. at 534; Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles,
F.2d 830, 839 (1984) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
289. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
290. Id. at 237.
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Furthermore, the Court in Midkiff explained that the concern in
Pullman to avoid "needless friction with state policies" was founded
upon the Pullman Court's specific identification of an unsettled
question of general state law that was susceptible of a limiting
construction:
In Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra, this Court held
that federal courts should abstain from decision when difficult and
unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be decided. By abstaining
in such cases, federal courts will avoid both unnecessary adjudication of federal questions and "needless friction with state policies. . . ." Id. 312 U.S., at 500, 61 S.Ct., at 645. However, federal
courts need not abstain on Pullman grounds when a state statute
is not 'fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary" the federal constitutional question.""'
Despite these clear precedents, in at least one federal circuit, the
Ninth, and, more recently, the Fourth, the decisions have begun to
approach a per se rule of abstention, authorizing abstention whenever the subject matter of the action is zoning or land use.292 Additionally, these two circuits have begun to combine Pullman and Burford-type analysis in ordering abstention. Such rules of decision
distort the principles upon which the Pullman and Burford abstention doctrines were based. As applied in section 1983 land use cases,
these judicial positions arguably conflict with the legislative purpose
of Congress.
2. The Emerging Per Se Rule of Abstention in Land Use
Cases in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.-The abstention decisions
in land use cases in the Ninth Circuit, and increasingly the Fourth
Circuit, display an assumption that an unsettled question of state
law exists in virtually every zoning or land use case. The judicial
analyses in these two circuits reveal a consistent equation of the unresolved question of the application of state law to a particular set of
circumstances with an unsettled question of state law principle of
general application. The courts in these circuits appear to view the
inevitable ad hoc nature of zoning and land use disputes, revolving
3
around what are sometimes described as post hoc rationalizations,1
291.
292.
293.
which are

Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
See infra notes 294-326 and appendix at 162.
The term "post hoc rationalization" refers to supportive evidence and theories
presented or developed to justify a public action after it has taken place. One court
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as meaning that there is an unsettled question of state law in every
such case and that therefore abstention is appropriate in every such
case. This approach, extends the abstention doctrine far beyond the
narrow exception established in Pullman and effectively holds, as a
matter of law, that the doubt created by the application of settled
state law principles to a particular set of circumstances is a sufficient
unsettled question of state law to override the Congressional mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Not surprisingly, the two circuits combined have order abstention in a high percentage of cases. (Figure
7)294

Figure 7
9th & 4th Circuit Abstention Decisions
All Land Use Cases, 1972-1988*

Abstention Declined (41.19W

Abstention Ordered (58. MS)

In Pearl Investment v. City and County of San Francisco,95 the
has described this phenomenon in the land use context as "after-the-fact" justifiacations. See
City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979).
* For a listing of specific cases, see appendix at 162.
294. See appendix, at 162.
295. 774 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1985), cen. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
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Ninth Circuit acknowledged that there were no unsettled questions
of state law:
Resolution of an issue of state law might be uncertain because the
particular statute is ambiguous, or because the precedents conflict,
or because the question is novel and of sufficient importance that it
ought to be addressed first by a state court. We do not find those
factors to be present in this case. Here there is much force to
Pearl's contention that the district court could have ascertained
the established standards applied by the California courts in reviewing zoning decisions and accordingly should have applied
those standards without deferring to state adjudication.""
Notwithstanding the Court's conclusion, the Court affirmed the district court's abstention because "[w]e do not write on a clean
slate. .. ."" The court explained that it was constrained to sustain
abstention because of the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions holding29 8
that abstention was appropriate in land use cases because "the resolution of state law questions is doubtful in virtually every case involving land use or zoning issues. ' 299 However, it is submitted that
this reasoning conflicts with the Supreme Court's directive in Pullman and its progeny that the unsettled question of state law for
which a federal court should defer to state court consideration must
involve an uncertain proposition of general law, not merely the uncertainty inherent in the application of a general legal principle to a
particular set of circumstances.
The plaintiff in Pearl Investment presented a claim of deprivation of its federal due process rights under San Francisco Municipal
Code Section 26, a discretionary review provision that twice before
had been upheld by the California Supreme Court as satisfying the
constitutional requirements for the delegation of discretionary power
under state law. 30 0 Unlike the circumstance supporting abstention in
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,30 1 the plaintiff did
not challenge the City's "authority" under state law to impose discretionary review to its permit application. Rather, it challenged on
296. 774 F.2d at 1465 (emphasis added).
297. Id.
298. See Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838 (9th
Cir. 1979); Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978).
299. Pearl Investment, 774 F.2d at 1465 (quoting the district court decision).
300. See City of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 347 P.2d 294, 305
(1959); Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 311, 144 P.2d 4 (1943).
301. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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federal constitutional grounds the result of the application of a legal
principle, twice-decided by the California Supreme Court, to a particular set of circumstances. Nevertheless, the federal court
abstained.
Within the Fourth Circuit, the emerging per se rule of abstention appears to be guided by an extreme judicial deference to state
courts in the area of land use policy-a Burford-type concern-and
the view that the "sensitive" nature of local land use issues necessarily gives rise to unsettled questions of state law. In Kent Island
Joint Venture v. Smith, 0 2 the court articulated this view in the following terms:
Land use regulation by zoning is 'distinctly a feature of local government' which is 'outside the general supervisory power of federal
courts.' [citation omitted]. A land use decision 'clearly involves
matters entirely within the realm of the state and local governments with which they are singularly familiar, and there are few
local issues more sensitive.' [citation omitted].
This Court is satisfied that plaintiff must challenge these land
use decisions of Queen Anne's County officials in the state courts of
Maryland. The dispute here is strictly a local matter as to which
federal intervention is both unwise and unwarranted. The reasonableness of zoning and other land use classifications is a question of
state law, the resolution of which could avoid or modify related
federal constitutional issues."'
The emerging per se rule of abstention in the Ninth Circuit and
Fourth Circuit creates an incongruous situation when considered in
the context of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata (a doctrine
of judicial repose) precludes the parties or those in privity with them
from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in a prior
action." 4 Under the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, a prior
decision in which a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to the judgment in that action will preclude relitigation of the
same issue in a suit based on a different cause of action but involving
302. 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978).
303. Id. at 462-63. See also Fralin & Waldron, Inc., v. City of Martinsville, 370 F.
Supp. 185, 191 (W. D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974); Caleb Stowe Assocs. v.
Albermarle County, 724 F.2d 1079, 1080 (4th Cir. 1984): Meredith v. Talbot County, 828
F.2d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 1987); Ad Soil Services, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 596 F.
Supp. 1139, 1142 (D. Md. 1984); Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,
680 F. Supp. 222, 226 (E.D. Va. 1988).
304. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876).
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a party to the first action.30 5 In the decisions of Allen v. McCurry,30
and Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Education,30 7 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that these doctrines of preclusion are applicable to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Allen
case, this Court noted that, contrary to the dissenting view of Justice
Blackmun,"0 8 its decision did not constitute an abandonment of the
principle established in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners. 9 that under Pullman abstention a plaintiff who is
remitted to state court is not precluded from litigating his federal
constitutional issues later in federal court.3"'
It is submitted, however, that the Supreme Court's decisions in
England and in Allen never contemplated the impossible circumstance in which the emerging abstention rule in these two circuits
places plaintiffs in land use cases brought under 1983. The assumption underlying the England principle is that there is an actual unsettled question of general state law which may be referred to the
state court for adjudication without a determination of the federal
Constitutional claims. Because land use cases inevitably involve
mixed questions of fact and law, the effect of the abstention rule
where, in fact, there are no unsettled questions of general state law is
to compel federal plaintiffs, without their consent, to submit their
federal constitutional claims to a state court determination. If state
ourt litigation depends upon the resolution of mixed questions of
fact and law, then a plaintiff will be barred from relitigation under
the doctrine of res judicata and will thereby be deprived of the federal forum that Congress deemed appropriate in 1871.11' On the
other hand, if res judicata is not preclusive, then the abstention rule
established by the Ninth Circuit would allow a plaintiff two bites at
the "land use" apple, a perversion of the principles of comity and
judicial efficiency on which the Pullman decision was based.
The decisions of the Supreme Court are emphatic in stating
that each abstention decision is a matter of discretion which must be
approached on a case-by-case basis, and not as a matter of the appli305. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
306. 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980).
307. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
308. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 112 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
309. 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
310. See 449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17.
311. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. at 472, 491-492 (1949). See Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d
1049 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1103 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 699 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1983).
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cation of a general rule. 1 ' Abstention is proper only in narrowly limited "special circumstances." 31 3 While many of the federal courts,
have paid lip service to this admonition, their decisions, in fact, reflect the application of a general rule of abstention in all land use or
zoning cases.

Of the two circuits, the Ninth Circuit's position is the most extreme. Other federal court of appeals decisions in which abstention
has been considered in a land use context have not followed the
Ninth Circuit's form of abstention analysis.3" 4 In fact, over the past
fifteen years, the only court of appeals decision brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 involving land use or zoning in which abstention has
been ordered, was based on the fact that there existed a pending
state court proceeding with which the federal court did not wish to
interfere. 1 5 That decision relied in essence upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,3 6 extending the principle of abstention articulated in Younger v. Harris," to state-initiated civil proceedings. In all other circuit court section 1983 cases
involving land use over the last fifteen years, the federal courts of
appeal have declined to abstain.3 18
The Ninth Circuit, and most recently district courts in the
312. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964).
313. 337 U.S. at 492.
314. See Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121, 1123-34 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Urbanizadora Versalles v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993, 998 (Ist Cir. 1983); City of Moore v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 699 F.2d 507, 510 (10th Cir. 1983); Heritage Farms, Inc.
v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743, 746-747 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990
(1982); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974); Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d
806, 811-12 (2nd Cir. 1973) rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). But see Nasser v.
City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 439-440 (11 th Cir. 1982); Fralin v. Waldron, Inc. v. City of
Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481, 483 (4th Cir. 1974); Muskegon Theatres v. City of Muskegon, 507
F.2d 199, 204 (6th Cir. 1974); Hill v. City of El Paso, 437 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1971).
315. See Central Avenue News v. City of Minot, 651 F.2d 565, 567 (8th Cir. 1981). See
also Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, Ohio, 539 F.2d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 1976); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1975); Hill v. City of El Paso, 437 F.2d 352,
356, 357 (5th Cir. 1971). But see Culebras Enterprises v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.
1987) (action held premature on ripeness grounds, but abstention mentioned as additional
ground for awaiting state court determination).
316. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
317. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
318. See Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 148 (1987); Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (Ist Cir. 1983); Heritage Farms v. Solesbury Township,
671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990 (1982); See also Boraas v. Village of
Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on grounds other than abstention, 416 U.S. 1
(1974).
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Fourth Circuit, have equated the existence of an "array" of state
and local land use laws and regulations in the State of California
with the existence of unsettled questions of state law.3 19 Speaking of
the denial of a building permit, the California Federal District Court
in Sederquist v. City of Tiburon3 2 0 stated:
Whether a city has abused its discretion by refusing to issue a
building permit is by nature a question turning on the peculiar
facts of each case in light of the many local and statewide land use
laws and regulations applicable to the area in question. We do not
claim to ability to predict whether a state court would decide that
the city here abused its discretion.
Speaking of a refusal to rezone, the Virginia Federal District Court
stated:
[lI]t is unclear under Virginia law whether the City Council abused
its discretion in refusing to rezone plaintiff's property, whether this
refusal effected a taking of the property and whether plaintiff has a
remedy for the alleged taking under the state's inverse condemnation procedure. See Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278,
282-83 (9th Cir. 1978) ... 322
The foregoing language quoted above from the Sederquist case,
the same language quoted by the Ninth Circuit in its decision in
Pearl Investment,3 1 3 and also relied upon by the Virginia District
Court, arguably is no more than a presumption of uncertain state
law based upon the existence of a complex but not unfathomable
array of land use laws and regulations in the State of California.
Such a judicial statement as quoted above should not substitute for
the precise analysis the Supreme Court has required in determining
whether there are, in fact, specific unsettled questions of general
state law which could be decided by a state court so as to avoid the
federal constitutional questions raised. 24 In the abstention decisions
319. See Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1094-95
(9th Cir. 1976). See also Northern Virginia Law School v. City of Alexandria, 680 F. Supp.
222 (E.D. Va. 1988).
320. 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978).
321. Id. at 282-83.
322. Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 680 F. Supp. 222, 226
(E.D. Va. 1988).
323. 774 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
324. The source of the Ninth Circuit's rigid abstention rule may be found in that Circuit's elevation of certain of Justice Frankfurter's language in Railroad Commission of Texas
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), to a formal test, thereby creating a third prong to the
Supreme Court's established two-prong test for applying the Pullman abstention doctrine.
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rendered by the Ninth Circuit involving land use or zoning since
Rancho Palos Verdes and Sederquist, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly invoked the axiom that the array of state and local land use
regulations at once makes "land use," by definition, a sensitive area
of social policy which inherently involves unsettled questions of state
3 25
law.
No decision of the Supreme Court has articulated the general
rule applied by the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, in which
uncertainty is found imbedded in every land use or zoning decision
merely because the federal court must examine a complex array of
statutes and ordinances in order to resolve the mixed questions of
law and fact before it. Rather, as the Supreme Court has said:
"[Tihe mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state tribunal for the start of another
'26
law suit.
3. The Separation of Powers Issue.-Article I of the Constitution of the United States provides that "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, . . 27
Article III of the Constitution provides that "[tjhe judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
Before reaching the questions of whether a federal complaint involves (i) an unsettled question
of general state law that is (ii) subject to an interpretation that will avoid the federal Constitutional question, the Ninth Circuit first determines whether the complaint "touches a sensitive
area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to
its adjudication is open." Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir.
1974) (quoting Pullman at 498). Justice Frankfurter's statement in Pullman was made in the
context of racial discrimination. In its decisions subsequent to Pullman, the Supreme Court
has not reiterated Justice Frankfurter's reference to sensitive constitutional issues nor made it
a criterion for abstention. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1967); Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168, 173 (1942).
As applied by the Ninth Circuit, this "social sensitivity" prong of its so-called Canton test
for Pullman abstention has so outweighed the Ninth Circuit's analysis under the principal
abstention criteria established by the Supreme Court that the Circuit's decisions have effectively equated "sensitive area of social policy" with unsettled questions of state law.
325. See Pearl Inv. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Summerland County Water Dist., 767 F.2d 544, 546 (9th Cir. 1985); C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of
Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1983); Shamrock Dev. Co. v. City of Concord, 656
F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1981); Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California, 601 F.2d 1087,
1091 (9th Cir. 1979); Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838,
841 (9th Cir. 1979); Newport Invs. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893, 894 (9th Cir.
1977).
326. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974).
327. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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establish." ' 2 8 The Supreme Court has construed this division of powers under the Constitution as meaning that "the federal lawmaking
power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government . . .,,3*9 In the celebrated "snail darter" case, TVA v. Hill,330
the Supreme Court underscored the importance of the separation of
powers principle as a direct restraint upon judicial law making:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each
branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is," . . . it is equally- and
emphatically- the exclusive province of the Congress not only to
formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects,
but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once
Congress, exercising its delegatedpowers, has decided the order of
priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the
laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is
33
sought. '
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 reflects these ordering of priorities
by Congress. Indeed, it constitutes a restructuring of the relationship
between the state and federal courts33 1 so as to ensure the effective
enforcement of Constitutional rights. It reflects a legislative social
policy judgment that the federal courts cannot disregard on any
3 33
grounds other than unconstitutionality.
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits' pursuit of what approaches a
per se rule of abstention in all cases involving land use or zoning
because of their stated uncertainty in deciding questions of fact in
light of "the many local and statewide land use laws" constitutes a
weighing of social and political policies-a function that the Constitution has assigned to the legislative branch under the separation of
powers principle. Where a federal court, as in Pearl Investment, 334
acknowledges in its opinion that the pertinent state law issues are
not uncertain yet nevertheless, invokes Pullman abstention, its decision constitutes an improper judicial incursion into a substantive
area where Congress has already spoken, undermining the enforce328.
329.
330.
331.
added).
332.
333.
334.

U.S. CONST. art. IIl, § I.
Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981).
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Id. at 194 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis
See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., IstSess., 149 (comments of Rep. Garfield).
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
Pearl Inv. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ment of the Civil Rights Act. As such, it violates the principle of

separation-of-powers between the legislative and judicial branches.335
4. The Merger of Pullman and Burford Abstention Doctrines.-In part, because of the increasing complexity of state land use regu-

latory schemes, some federal courts, particularly those in the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits, have applied a form of abstention analysis that
appears to equate the complexity of a regulatory scheme with the
"*uncertain state law" requirement of Pullman abstention. Although

these decisions are not always explicit in identifying the Burfordtype concern for disrupting a perceived interlocking scheme of local
and state regulations, it is apparent that the Burford-type considera-

tions are also present. For example, in Rancho Palos Verdes Corporation v. City of Laguna Beach,336 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
lower court's abstention on Pullman grounds and even stated that
Burford abstention was inappropriate. 3 ' But the court's reasoning
nevertheless contains strands of Burford abstention analysis:
The complaint involves land use planning .... [T]he state has
enacted a web of statutes ....
California is attempting to grapple
with difficult land use problems through new policies and new
mechanisms of regulation. The state is also struggling with the
problem facing cities and counties in those cases where their zoning
efforts to preserve open space in response to the state's announced
policy . .. may unwittingly have resulted in a seizure of property
rights that they did not intend and cannot afford. Federal courts
must be wary of intervention that will stifle innovative state efforts
to find solutions to complex problems. 8 '

Similarly, in Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, as9 the court stated
more explicitly:
The appropriateness of combining the principles of Pullman
and Burford has been recognized in varying degrees by those
335. The unfounded abstention ordered by federal courts will also effect a delay or forever foreclose the exercise of federal jurisdiction, a result that Congress never contemplated in
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Supreme Court has previously condemned such
unnecessary delay that results from the application of the abstention doctrine. See Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, §
52 at 305 (1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 3-40 at 151 (1978).
336. 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976)
337. Id. at 1096.
338. Id. at 1094-95. See also C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1983).
339. 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978).
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courts ordering abstention in cases challenging state land use
policy.
[S]tate land use policy is a sensitive matter subject to comprehensive local regulation. For a federal court to exercise its jurisdiction
in areas of important state domestic policy creates an "unseemly
conflict between two sovereignties, [and] the unnecessary impairment of state functions . . . ." Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219,
224, 79 S.Ct. 1034, 1037 3 L.Ed.2d 1186 (1959).
Accordingly,
340
Burford-type abstention is also appropriate here.
Recent decisions in the Fourth Circuit indicate that the courts
of that circuit now regard land use planning as an area not only of
unique local concern but one subject to a state-wide regulatory
scheme sufficient to support Burford abstention. In Northern Virginia Law School v. City of Alexandria,14 1 the district court reasoned, using the Ninth Circuit's Canton test, that the three require3 42
ments of that test had been met:
First, it is indisputable that land use planning is a sensitive area of
state policy. See Kollsman, 737 F.2d 830, 833; Fralin & Waldron,
493 F.2d 481, 483; Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F.
Supp. 455, 461 (D. Md. 1978). Moreover, a state court ruling on
the issues presented by plaintiffs Complaint could moot the federal
constitutional issue or present it in a different posture ....
Finally,
it is uncertain under Virginia law whether the City Council abused
its discretion in refusing to rezone plaintiff's property, whether this
refusal effected a taking of the property and whether plaintiff has a
remedy for the alleged taking under the state's inverse condemnation procedure. See Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278,
282-83 (9th cir. 1978) (whether state court would order compensation for a regulatory taking and whether city abused its discretion
in refusing to issue a building permit are uncertain questions of
state law).
[A]bstention is also warranted under the reasoning of Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424
(1943). There, the Supreme Court admonished federal courts to
defer to state courts where federal intervention would needlessly
disrupt a state's administration of purely local affairs. Id. at 33334, 63 S.Ct. at 1107-1108; see also Kent Island, 452 F. Supp. 455,
461. Land use planning, as previously noted, is an area of uniquely
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 462-63.
680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).
See supra notes 231-240 and accompanying text.
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local concern and, in Virginia, is the subject of an extensive regulatory scheme. See VA. CODE §§ 15.1-427 to -503.2. 3, 3
The court also found Pullman abstention appropriate, equating
the questions of whether the city council in that case abused its discretion in refusing to rezone plaintiff's property, whether the refusal
effected a taking and whether the plaintiff had a remedy for the alwith
leged taking under the state's inverse condemnation procedure
344
Pullman.
under
standard
law
state
of
the unsettled question
The importation of Burford abstention into federal court analysis of land use cases arguably is improper in light of the less than
comprehensive and coherent regulatory systems which characterize
land use control in most states. From a planning standpoint, regulation in accordance with state, regional and local comprehensive plans
is desirable. However, until such a system of land use controls is
achieved, and a procedure is tailored to address appeals from decisions made under that system, the conceptual basis for the application of Burford abstention is more fiction than reality and is therefore inappropriate.
The procedural danger of this evolving merger of the Pullman
and Burford abstention doctrines for property owner claims is that
the proper procedural course of action under Burford is dismissal,
rather than the staying of the action. Where the federal courts have
the option to stay the action or dismiss, it is likely that they will
more often dismiss the action for reasons of judicial economy and
convenience.
CONCLUSION

The increasing use of the ripeness and abstention doctrines by
the federal courts to dismiss constitutional claims brought by property owners under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourteenth and
fifth amendments generally, is a phenomenon which has resulted in
the virtual exclusion of property owners' claims from the federal
courthouse. Such a result was never intended by the Congress when
it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The uncertain state of the
law with respect to the ripeness doctrine in land use disputes- particularly the application of the finality requirement-reflects the fail343. Id. at 226. See also Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Subdivision approved process held to be governed by a complex regulatory scheme sufficient
to justify Burford abstention.
344. Id.
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ure of the Supreme Court to understand the practical realities of
land use control and to give meaningful guidance to the lower federal courts. The perversion, in some circuits, and the misapplication
in others, of the abstention doctrine in land use cases, also calls for
correction and guidance from the Supreme Court.

1988]

CLOSING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR

APPENDIX

Figure 1
Federal Court Land Use Ripeness Decisions 1983-1988
(36 cases examined)
Regulatory Taking Claim Held Unripe
(34 cases)
1st Circuit:
*1. Ochoa Realty Corp. v. Faria, 815 F.2d 812 (1st Cir.
1987).
*2. Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506
(1st Cir. 1987).
*3. Golemis v. Kirby, 632 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1985).
2nd Circuit:
4.

Weissman v. Fruchtman, 700 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).

3rd Circuit:
*5. Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d
1023 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906.
6. Elsa Doerinkel v. Hillsborough Township, No. 86-1823
(D.N.J. May 25, 1988) (WESTLAW, DCT database;
1988 WL 54662).
4th Circuit:
*7. Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,
680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).
*8. Wintercreek Apartments v. City of St. Peters, 682 F.
Supp. 989 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
5th Circuit:
*9. Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New
Orleans, 665 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D.La. 1987).
6th Circuit:
*10. Four Seasons Apartment v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775
F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1985).
* Denotes claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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7th Circuit:
*11.
*12.
*13.
*14.

Muscarello v. Village of Hampshire, 644 F. Supp. 1016
(N.D. I11. 1986).
Beachy v. Board of Aviation Comm'rs, 699 F. Supp. 742
(S.D. Ind. 1988).
Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d
461 (7th Cir. 1988).
Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Guzzo, No. 88 C 2547 (N.D.
I11. Nov. 14, 1988) (WESTLAW, DCT database; 1988
WL 123932).

8th Circuit:
*15.
*16.
*17.

Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986).
JBK, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 641 F. Supp. 893 (W.D.
Mo. 1986).
Jacobs v. City of Minneapolis, No. 4-87-397 (D. Minn.
Aug. 4, 1987) (WESTLAW, DCT database; 1987 WL
14716).

9th Circuit:
*18.
*19.

*20.
*21.

*22.
23.
*24.
*25.
26.
27.

Norco Construction, Inc., v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143
(9th Cir. 1986).
Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, modified,
830 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 775
(1988).
Cassettari v. County of Nevada, 824 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.
1987).
Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis
Obispo, 830 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 79 (1988).
Lai v. City of Honolulu, 841 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1988).
Austin v. City of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1988).
Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 134 (1988).
Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926 (D.
Haw. 1986).
Union Pacific R.R. v. Idaho, 654 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Idaho
1987).
Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal
1988).
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28.
*29.
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Stephans v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 697 F.
Supp. 1149 (D. Nev. 1988).
Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988).

10th Circuit:
*30.

*31.
*32.
*33.
*34.

Landmark Land Co. v. Buchanan, Nos. 85-2458, 85-2538
(10th Cir. Nov. 30, 1988) (WESTLAW, DCT database;
1988 WL 126469).
Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D.
Utah 1986).
Amwest Investments, Ltd. v. City of Aurora, 701 F. Supp.
1508 (D. Colo. 1988).
Bernstein v. Holland, 657 F. Supp. 233 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
Carrol v. City of Prattville, 653 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ala.
1987).
Regulatory Taking Claim Held Ripe
(2 cases)

9th Circuit:
*1.

Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 703 F.2d
1141 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983).
1I1th Circuit:
*2.
Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11th
Cir. 1987).
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Figure 2
Reasons For Dismissal In Federal Court
Land Use Ripeness Decisions 1983-1988
(35 cases examined)
No Final Decision
(9 cases)
2nd Circuit:
1.

Weissman v. Fruchtman, 700 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).

3rd Circuit:
2.

Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d
1023 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987).

9th Circuit:
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143 (9th
Cir. 1986).
Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo,
830 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 79
(1988).
Lai v. City of Honolulu, 841 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1988).
Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 134 (1988).
Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
Stephens v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 697 F. Supp.
1149 (D. Nev. 1988).

10th Circuit:
9.

Landmark Land Co. v. Buchanan, Nos. 85-2458, 85-2538
(10th Cir. Nov. 30, 1988) (WESTLAW, DCT database; ).
State Compensation Procedures Unused
(19 cases)

1st Circuit:
1.
2.

Ochoa Realty Corp. v. Faria, 815 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1987).
Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506
(1st Cir. 1987).
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3.

Golemis v. Kirby, 632 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1985).

3rd Circuit:
4.

Elsa Doerinkel v. Hillsborough Township, No. 86-1823
(D.N.J. May 25, 1988) (WESTLAW, DCT database; 1988
WL 54662).

4th Circuit:
5.

Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,
680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).

5th Circuit:
6.

Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New drleans,
665 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. La. 1987).

6th Circuit:
7.

Four Seasons Apartment v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775
F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1985).

7th Circuit:
8.
9.
10.
11.

Muscarello v. Village of Hampshire, 644 F. Supp. 1016
(N.D. I11. 1986).
Beachy v. Board of Aviation Comm'rs, 699 F. Supp. 742
(S.D. Ind. 1988).
Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461
(7th Cir. 1988).
Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Guzzo, No. 88 C 2547 (N.D.
I11. Nov. 14, 1988) (WESTLAW, DCT database; 1988 WL
123932).

8th Circuit:
12.
13.
14.

Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986).
JBK, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 641 F. Supp. 893 (W.D.
Mo. 1986).
Jacobs v. City of Minneapolis, No. 4-87-397 (D. Minn.
Aug. 4, 1987) (WESTLAW, DCT database; 1987 WL
14716).

9th Circuit:
15.
16.

Cassettari v. Nevada County, 824 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1987).
Austin v. City of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Union Pacific R.R. v. Idaho, 654 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Idaho
1987).
Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988).

1 th Circuit:
19.

Carroll v. City of Prattville, 653 F. Supp. 933 (M.D. Ala.
1987).
Both Prongs of Ripeness Doctrine Unsatisfied
(6 cases)

4th Circuit:
1.

Wintercreek Apartments v. City of St. Peters, 682 F. Supp.
989 (E.D. Mo. 1988).

9th Circuit:
2.

3.

Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, modified, 830
F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 775
(1988).
Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926 (D.
Haw. 1986).

10th Circuit:
4.
5.

Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah
1986).
Amwest Investments, Ltd. v. City of Aurora, 701 F. Supp,
1508 (D. Colo. 1988).

1 th Circuit:
6.

Bernstein v. Holland, 657 F. Supp. 233 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
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Figure 3
Federal Court § 1983 Abstention Decisions 1972-1988
(43 cases examined)
Abstention Declined
(22 cases)
1st Circuit:
1.
2.
3.

Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993
(1st Cir. 1983).
Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp.
947 (D.N.H. 1971).
Hotel Coamo Springs, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 426 F.
Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976).

2nd Circuit:
4.

5.

Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (on
grounds other than abstention).
Waltentas v. Lipper, 636 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

3rd Circuit:
6.
Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990 (1982).
7.
Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 148 (1987).
8. Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp.
709 (D.N.J. 1976).
9.
Amico v. New Castle County, 553 F. Supp. 738 (D. Del.
1982).
10.
Brown v. Pornography Comm'n, 620 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
11.
Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 F. Supp. 1024
(D.N.J. 1988).
12.
Epstein v. Township of Whitehall, 693 F. Supp. 309 (E.D.
Pa. 1988).
4th Circuit:
13.

Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp.
1315 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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Chertkof v. Mayor of Baltimore, 497 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Md. 1980).

7th Circuit:
15.

Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded without opinion, 510 F.2d 976 (7th
Cir. 1975).

9th Circuit:
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.
1974)
Adultworld Bookstore v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348 (9th
Cir. 1985).
McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987).
M.J. Brock & Sons v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
Blodgett v. County of Santa Cruz, 502 F. Supp. 204 (N.D.
Cal. 1980).

10th Circuit:
21.

Oberndorf v. City of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo.
1986).

D.C Circuit:
22.

Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 394 (1988).
Abstention Ordered
(21 cases)

1st Circuit:
1.
2.

Culebras Enters. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.
1987).
Coombs v. Town of Ogunquit, 578 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Me.
1984).

2nd Circuit:
3.
4.

Northeast Mines, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 584 F. Supp.
112 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Rattner v. Board of Trustees, 611 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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3rd Circuit:
5.
Salvati v. Dale, 364 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
6.
Glen-Gery Corp. v. Lower Heidelberg Township, 608 F.
Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
4th Circuit:
7.

8.
9.
10.

Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 370 F.
Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.
1974).
Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987).
Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D.
Md. 1978).
Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,
680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).

6th Circuit:
11.
12.

Forest Hills Utility Co. v. City of Heath, 539 F.2d 592 (6th
Cir. 1976).
Danish News Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 517 F. Supp. 86
(E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd without opinion, 751 F.2d. 384
(6th Cir. 1984).

7th Circuit:
13.

Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975).

8th Circuit:
14.
15.

Central Ave. News, Inc. v. City of Minot, 651 F.2d 565
(8th Cir. 1981).
Corder v. City of Sherwood, 579 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Ark.
1984).

9th Circuit:
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547
F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976)
Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893
(9th Cir. 1977).
C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1983).
Pearl Inv. Co. v City of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe,
820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987).
Beck v. California, 479 F. Supp. 392 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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Figure 4
All Federal Court Land Use Abstention Decisions 1972-1988

(86 cases examined)
Abstention Declined
(42 cases)
1st Circuit:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993
(1st Cir. 1983).
Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp.
947 (D.N.H. 1971).
Hotel Coamo Springs, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 426 F.
Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976).
Chan v. Town of Brookline, 484 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Mass.
1980).

2nd Circuit:
5.

6.
7.
8.

Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (on
grounds other than abstention).
Hill Constr. Co. v. Connecticut, 366 F. Supp. 737 (D.
Conn. 1973).
Town of Springfield, v. Vermont Envtl. Bd., 521 F. Supp.
243 (D. Vt. 1981).
Waltentas v. Lipper, 636 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

3rd Circuit:
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990 (1982).
Izzo v. Borough of River Edge, 843 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir.
1988).
Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp.
709 (D.N.J. 1976).
Amico v. New Castle County, 553 F. Supp. 738 (D. Del.
1982).
Brown v. Pornography Comm'n, 620 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
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14.

15.
16.

Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 617 F. Supp. 1488, corrected,
620 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1985), affid, 811 F.2d 171 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 148 (1987).
Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 F. Supp. 1024
(D.N.J. 1988).
Epstein v. Township of Whitehall, 693 F. Supp. 309 (E.D.
Pa. 1988).

4th Circuit:
17.
18.

19.
20.

Timmons v. Andrews, 538 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1976).
Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567
F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905
(1978).
Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp.
1315 (E.D. Va. 1979).
Chertkof v. Mayor of Baltimore, 497 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Md. 1980).

6th Circuit:
21.

Bannum, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 666 F. Supp. 1091
(W.D. Tenn. 1986).

7th Circuit:
22.
23.

24.
25.

E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 821 F.2d 433
(7th Cir. 1987).
Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded without opinion, 510 F.2d 976 (7th
Cir. 1975).
Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148 (N.D.
Ill. 1975).
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316
(S.D. Ind. 1984), aftd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).

8th Circuit:
26.
27.
28.

United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
Marjak, Inc. v. Cowling, 626 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Ark,
1985).
People Tags, Inc. v. Jackson County Legislature, 636 F.
Supp. 1345 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
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9th Circuit:
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.
1974).
Shamrock Dev. Co. v. City of Concord, 656 F.2d 1380 (9th
Cir. 1981).
Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Cinema Arts, Inc. v. County of Clark, 722 F.2d 579 (9th
Cir. 1983).
Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
Adultworld Bookstore v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348 (9th
Cir. 1985).
McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 906 (1987).
M.J. Brock & Sons v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
Blodgett v. County of Santa Cruz, 502 F. Supp. 204 (N.D.
Cal. 1980).

10th Circuit:
38.
39.

City of Moore v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., 699 F.2d 507
(10th Cir. 1983).
Oberdorf v. City of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo.
1986).

1 th Circuit:
40.

Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432 (11th Cir.
1982).

41.

Bayside Enters. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla.
1978).

D.C. Circuit:
42.

Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 394 (1988).
Abstention Ordered
(44 cases)

1st Circuit:
1.

Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272 (1st Cir. 1972).
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3.
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Culebras Enters. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.
1987).
Coombs v. Town of Ogunquit, 578 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Me.
1984).

2nd Circuit:
4.

5.
6.
7.

Wigginess, Inc. v. Fruchtman, 482 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'd with directions without opinion, 628 F.2d 1346
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
Northeast Mines, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 584 F. Supp.
112 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Rattner v. Board of Trustees, 611 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
Onondaga Landfill Sys., Inc. v. Williams, 624 F. Supp. 25
(N.D.N.Y. 1985).

3rd Circuit:
8.
9.
10.

Salvati v. Dale, 364 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
Hovsons, Inc. v. Secretary of the Interior, 519 F. Supp. 434
(D.N.J. 1981), aft'd, 711 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1983).
Glen-Gery Corp. v. Lower Heidelberg Township, 608 F.
Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

4th Circuit:
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 370 F.
Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973), aft'd, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.
1974).
Caleb Stowe Assocs. v. Albemarle County, 724 F.2d 1079
(4th Cir. 1984).
Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987).
Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D.
Md. 1978).
Ad Soil Services, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 596 F.
Supp. 1139 (D. Md. 1984).
Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,
680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).

5th Circuit:
17.

P. C. Utils. Corp. v. Division of Health of Dep't of Health
& Rehabilitative Servs., 339 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Fla. 1972),
affid without opinion, 472 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1973).
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6th Circuit:
18.
19.
20.

21.

Muskegon Theaters, Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d
199 (6th Cir. 1974).
Forest Hills Utility Co. v. City of Heath, 539 F.2d 592 (6th
Cir. 1976).
Danish News Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 517 F. Supp. 86
(E.D. Mich. 1981), affid without opinion, 751 F.2d. 384
(6th Cir. 1984).
J.V. Peters and Co. v. Hazardous Waste Facility Approval
Bd., 596 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1984).

7th Circuit:
22.

Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975).

8th Circuit:
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Central Ave. News, Inc. v. City of Minot, 651 F.2d 565
(8th Cir. 1981).
Bob's Home Serv., Inc. v. Warren County, 755 F.2d 625
(8th Cir. 1985).
Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 379 F. Supp.
1316 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
Corder v. City of Sherwood, 579 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Ark.
1984).
Holt v. City of Maumelle, 647 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Ark.
1986).

9th Circuit:
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547
F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976).
Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893
(9th Cir. 1977)
Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.
1978).
Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista,
596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir 1979).
Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California, 601 F.2d 1087
(9th Cir. 1979).
Beck v. California, 479 F. Supp. 392 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1983).
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35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
Pearl Inv. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe,
820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987).
Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, 652 F.
Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
Rooke v. City of Scotts Valley, 664 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).

11th Circuit:
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Fields v. Rockdale County, 785 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1986).
Stallworth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236
(S.D.Ala. 1976).
Dome Condominium Ass'n v. Goldenberg, 442 F. Supp. 438
(S.D. Fla. 1977).
East Naples Water Sys., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
627 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
A.B.T. Corp. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 664 F. Supp. 488
(S.D. Fla.), aftd, 835 F.2d 1439 '(1lth Cir. 1987).
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Figure 5
Section 1983 Land Use Absention Decisions By Federal Circuit
1972-1988
1st Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.
3.

Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993
(1st Cir. 1983).
Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp.
947 (D.N.H. 1971).
Hotel Coamo Springs, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 426 F.
Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976).
Abstention Ordered

4.
5.

Culebras Enters. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.
1987).
Coombs v. Town of Ogunquit, 578 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Me.
1984).

2nd Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.

2.

Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (on
grounds other than abstention).
Waltentas v. Lipper, 636 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Abstention Ordered

3.
4.

Northeast Mines, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 584 F. Supp.
112 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Rattner v. Board of Trustees, 611 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).

3rd Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.

Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990 (1982).
Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 148 (1987).
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp.
709 (D.N.J. 1976).
Amico v. New Castle County, 553 F. Supp. 738 (D. Del.
1982).
Brown v. Pornography Comm'n, 620 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 F. Supp. 1024
(D.N.J. 1988).
Epstein v. Township of Whitehall, 693 F. Supp. 309 (E.D.
Pa. 1988).
Abstention Ordered

8.
9.

Salvati v. Dale, 364 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
Glen-Gery Corp. v. Lower Heidelberg Township, 608 F.
Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

4th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.

Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp.
1315 (E.D. Va. 1979).
Chertkof v. Mayor of Baltimore, 497 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Md. 1980).
Abstention Ordered

3.

4.
5.
6.

Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 370 F.
Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.
1974).
Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987).
Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D.
Md. 1978).
Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,
680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).

5th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
None
Abstention Ordered

None
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6th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
None
Abstention Ordered
1.
2.

Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 539 F.2d 592 (6th
Cir. 1976).
Danish News Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 517 F. Supp. 86
(E.D. Mich. 1981), af'd without opinion, 751 F.2d. 384
(6th Cir. 1984).

7th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.

Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded without opinion, 510 F.2d 976 (7th
Cir. 1975).
Abstention Ordered

2.

Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975).

8th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
None
Abstention Ordered
1.
2.

Central Ave. News, Inc. v. City of Minot, 651 F.2d 565
(8th Cir. 1981).
Corder v. City of Sherwood, 579 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Ark.
1984).

9th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.
3.
4.

Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.
1974)
Adultworld Bookstore v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348 (9th
Cir. 1985).
McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 906 (1987).
M.J. Brock & Sons v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
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5.

Blodgett v. County of Santa Cruz, 502 F. Supp. 204 (N.D.
Cal. 1980).
Abstention Ordered

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547
F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976).
Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893
(9th Cir. 1977).
C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1983).
Pearl Inv. Co. v City of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe,
820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987).
Beck v. California, 479 F. Supp. 392 (C.D. Cal. 1979).

10th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.

Oberndorf v. City of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo.
1986).
Abstention Ordered

None
D.C. Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.

Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 394 (1988).
Abstention Ordered

None
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Figure 6
All Land Use Abstention Decisions By Federal Circuit 1972-1988
1st Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.
3.
4.

Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993
(1st Cir. 1983).
Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp.
947 (D.N.H. 1971).
Hotel Coamo Springs, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 426 F.
Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976).
Chan v. Town of Brookline, 484 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Mass.
1980).
Abstention Ordered

5.
6.
7.

Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272 (1st Cir. 1972).
Culebras Enters. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.
1987).
Coombs v. Town of Ogunquit, 578 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Me.
1984).

2nd Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), revd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (on
grounds other than abstention).
Lerner v. Town of Islip, 272 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
Hill Constr. Co. v. Connecticut, 366 F. Supp. 737 (D.
Conn. 1973).
Town of Springfield v. Vermont Envtl. Bd., 521 F. Supp.
243 (D. Vt. 1981).
Waltentas v. Lipper, 636 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Abstention Ordered

6.

7.

Wigginess, Inc. v. Fruchtman, 482 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), affd with directions without opinion, 628 F.2d 1346
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
Northeast Mines, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 584 F. Supp.
112 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).

1988]
8.
9.
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Rattner v. Board of Trustees, 611 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
Onondaga Landfill Sys., Inc. v. Williams, 624 F. Supp. 25
(N.D.N.Y. 1985).

3rd Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990 (1982).
Izzo v. Borough of River Edge, 843 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir.
1988).
Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp.
709 (D.N.J. 1976).
Amico v. New Castle County, 553 F. Supp. 738 (D. Del.
1982).
Brown v. Pornography Comm'n, 620 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 617 F. Supp. 1488, corrected,
620 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1985), afftd, 811 F.2d 171 (3d
cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 148 (1987).
Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 F. Supp. 1024
(D.N.J. 1988).
Epstein v. Township of Whitehall, 693 F. Supp. 309 (E.D.
Pa. 1988).
Abstention Ordered

9.
10.
11.

Salvati v. Dale, 364 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
Hovsons, Inc. v. Secretary of the Interior, 519 F. Supp. 434
(D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 711 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1983).
Glen-Gery Corp. v. Lower Heidelberg Township, 608 F.
Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

4th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.
3.

Timmons v. Andrews, 538 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1976).
Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567
F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905
(1978).
Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp.
1315 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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Chertkof v. Mayor of Baltimore, 497 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Md. 1980).
Abstention Ordered

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 370 F.
Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973), afid, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.
1974).
Caleb Stowe Assocs. v. Albemarle County, 724 F.2d 1079
(4th Cir. 1984).
Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987).
Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D.
Md. 1978).
Ad Soil Services, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 596 F.
Supp. 1139 (D. Md. 1984).
Northern Virginia Law School, Inc., Inc. v. City of
Alexandria, 680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).

5th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
None
Abstention Ordered
1.

P.C. Utils. Corp. v. Division of Health of Dep't of Health
& Rehabilitative Servs., 339 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Fla. 1972),
aff'd without opinion, 472 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1973).

6th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.

Bannum, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 666 F. Supp. 1091
(W.D. Tenn. 1986).
Abstention Ordered

2.
3.
4.

5.

Muskegon Theaters, Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d
199 (6th Cir. 1974).
Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 539 F.2d 592 (6th
Cir. 1976).
Danish News Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 517 F. Supp. 86
(E.D. Mich. 1981), afl'd without opinion, 751 F.2d. 384
(6th Cir. 1984).
J.V. Peters and Co. v. Hazardous Waste Facility Approval
Bd., 596 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1984).

1988]
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7th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.

3.
4.

E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 821 F.2d 433
(7th Cir. 1987).
Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded without opinion, 510 F.2d 976 (7th
Cir. 1975).
Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, Illinois, 404 F. Supp.
148 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316
(S.D. Ind. 1984), affid, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
Abstention Ordered

1.

Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975).

8th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.
3.

United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
Marjak, Inc. v. Cowling, 626 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Ark,
1985).
People Tags, Inc. v. Jackson County Legislature, 636 F.
Supp. 1345 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
Abstention Ordered

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Central Ave. News, Inc. v. City of Minot, 651 F.2d 565
(8th Cir. 1981).
Bob's Home Serv., Inc. v. Warren County, 755 F.2d 625
(8th Cir. 1985).
Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 379 F. Supp.
1316 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
Corder v. City of Sherwood, 579 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Ark.
1984).
Holt v. City of Maumelle, 647 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Ark.
1986).

9th Circuit:
1.

Abstention Declined
Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.
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2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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Shamrock Dev. Co. v. City of Concord, 656 F.2d 1380 (9th
Cir. 1981)
Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Cinema Arts, Inc. v. County of Clark, 722 F.2d 579 (9th
Cir. 1983).
Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).
Adultworld Bookstore v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348 (9th
Cir. 1985).
McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 906 (1987).
M.J. Brock & Sons v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
Blodgett v. County of Santa Cruz, 502 F. Supp. 204 (N.D.
Cal. 1980).
Abstention Ordered

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547
F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976).
Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893
(9th Cir. 1977).
Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.
1978).
Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista,
596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir 1979).
Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California 601 F.2d 1087 (9th
Cir. 1979).
Beck v. California, 479 F. Supp. 392 (C.D. Cal 1979).
C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1983).
Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
Pearl Inv. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe,
820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987).
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20.
21.

Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, 652 F.
Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
Rooke v. City of Scotts Valley, 664 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).

10th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.

City of Moore v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., 699 F.2d 507
(10th Cir. 1983).
Oberndorf v. City of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo.
1986).
Abstention Ordered

None
11 th Circuit:
Abstention Declined
1.
2.

Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432 (11 th Cir.
1982).
Bayside Enters. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla.
1978).
Abstention Ordered

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Fields v. Rockdale County, 785 F.2d 1558 (11 th Cir. 1986).
Stallworth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.
Ala. 1976).
Dome Condominium Ass'n v. Goldenberg, 442 F. Supp. 438
(S.D. Fla. 1977).
East Naples Water Sys., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
627 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
A.B.T. Corp., v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 664 F. Supp. 488
(S.D. Fla.), affd, A.B.T. Corp. v. Ft. Lauderdale, 835 F.2d
1439 (lth Cir. 1987).
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Figure 7
Ninth And Fourth Circuit Land Use Abstention Decisions
1972-1988
Abstention Declined
(13 cases)
9th Circuit:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.
1974).
Shamrock Dev. Co. v. City of Concord, 656 F.2d 1380 (9th
Cir. 1981).
Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
1Cinema Arts, Inc. v. County of Clark, 722 F.2d 579 (9th
Cir. 1983).
Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
Adultworld Bookstore v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348 (9th
Cir. 1985).
McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 906 (1987).
M.J. Brock & Sons v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
Blodgett v. County of Santa Cruz, 502 F. Supp. 204 (N.D.
Cal. 1980).

4th Circuit:
10.
11.

12.
13.

Timmons v. Andrews, 538 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1976).
Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567
F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905
(1978).
Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp.
1315 (E.D. Va. 1979).
Chertkof v. Mayor of Baltimore, 497 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Md. 1980).
Abstention Ordered
(18 cases)

9th Circuit:
I.
Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547

CLOSING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR

1988]

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893
(9th Cir. 1977).
Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.
1978).
Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista,
596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979).
Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California 601 F.2d 1087 (9th
Cir. 1979).
Beck v. California, 479 F. Supp 392 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1983).
Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).

9.

Pearl Inv. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th

10.

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe,
820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987).

11.

Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, 652 F.

12.

Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
Rooke v. City of Scotts Valley, 664 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).

4th Circuit:
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 370 F.
Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.
1974).
Caleb Stowe Assocs. v. Albemarle County, 724 F.2d 1079
(4th Cir. 1984).
Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228-(4th Cir. 1987).
Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D.
Md. 1978).
Ad Soil Servs., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 596 F.
Supp. 1139 (D. Md. 1984).
Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,
680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).

